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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT					
2	WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FORT SMITH DIVISION					
3	SCOTT DAY and GLENDA V. WILSON,)					
4	<pre>individually and on behalf of ) all others similarly situated, )</pre>					
5	Plaintiffs, )					
6	vs. ) Case No. 2:13-CV-2164					
7	WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, ) @ Fort Smith, Arkansas					
8	Defendant. )					
9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS					
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE P. K. HOLMES, III UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE					
11	OCTOBER 6, 2014					
12	APPEARANCES					
13	For the Plaintiffs: MR. KENNETH R. SHEMIN Shemin Law Firm, PLLC					
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23	REPORTED BY:					
24	RICK L. CONGDON, RMR, FCRR					
25	Federal Official Court Reporter P. O. Box 8493 Fort Smith, Arkansas 72902 PROCEEDINGS RECORDED STENOGRAPHICALLY; PRODUCED VIA C.A.T.					

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1		APPEARANCES	(Conti	nued)	
2	For the Objectors:			M E. LEDBETTER	
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4				Third Street Rock, Arkansas	72201
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6	Others present:		MR. LES	STER SOTSKY	
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## PROCEEDINGS OF OCTOBER 6, 2014

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THE COURT: Good morning.

AUDIENCE: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We are here this morning in the matter of Scott Day versus Glenda -- and Glenda Wilson versus Whirlpool Corporation. The case number is 13-CV-2164. And we are here this morning on a joint amended motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. And what I'd like to do, the way I would like to proceed first is identify the parties who are here. And counsel, Mr. Shemin, counsel for the Plaintiff, if you'll introduce yourself and who's at your counsel table with you.

MR. SHEMIN: Your Honor, I'm here at counsel table alone, and I represent the putative class.

THE COURT: Okay. And for Whirlpool, Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: Yeah, Bob Jones for Whirlpool. And Bill Latham, Robert Brunson, Les, and Vicki Bronson.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you. And also, as you know, there are some objectors who have, who have filed an objection to the proposed settlement, and Whirlpool filed a motion to strike which I denied, and I note that we also have present in court Mr. Sam Ledbetter, who is the attorney for the objectors.

MR. LEDBETTER: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning.

represent the objectors who are plaintiffs in the two separate cases pending in your court, the Kralicek case and the Wilkinson case, and I have with me this morning Ross Noland also from our firm, McMath Woods.

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THE COURT: Since the Court denied the motion to strike and notes that the objectors are present, what I intend to do is to let the -- to hear the statements of counsel and the objectors, and I'm going to have the Plaintiff go first and then have the Defendant Whirlpool follow after the Plaintiff, and then I'm going to give the objectors an opportunity to speak to the issues, too. I will note though, although I didn't grant the motion to strike, you know, the Court does have some question at this stage about the objectors not being parties, having the right to object. However, after, after looking at the procedural, the posture of this case and what different courts do in regard to objectors, the Court felt that it was best to hear out some of the objections of some of the putative class members at this time so the Court can make an informed decision on the classification -- of whether or not the class ought to be certified and, secondly, as to the fairness of the settlement. So let me, let me also state how -- what I intend to do in regard to the motion. There are -- the way the motion is drafted for the class settlement, it gives -- it asks really the Court to take two steps, first, to approve the fairness of the settlement, and then, number

two, notify the class. What I fully intend to do and there's actually, you know, a provision, an opinion about how to proceed. I fully intend to do a rigorous analysis of Rule 23(a) on classification at this stage and not at a later stage, so today when you address the issues about the settlement, I also want you to address the issues about certification as well. Okay? Okay. Mr. Shemin?

MR. SHEMIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Judge, may it please the Court. Thank you for the opportunity to be present today and to explain our position. I want to start off by giving you a score card as best I can. As I understand it from Mr. Ledbetter, he, and I take him at his word, obviously, he represents all but 19 of the proposed well ban class. And then, Your Honor, by my count, there would be 42 putative class members that he does not represent in the fringe -- the proposed fringe class.

THE COURT: Is that inclusive of the 19 or is that -MR. SHEMIN: These are property -- these are
properties, Your Honor, and not individuals.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHEMIN: And coincidentally, just for the score card, it turns out that there are 53 properties in the well ban class and 53 properties in the fringe class. So that's, that's the numbers as I understand it.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, we are going to be dealing

with individuals rather than properties, aren't we?

MR. SHEMIN: Right.

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, the --

MR. SHEMIN: Yeah, I just wanted to make --

THE COURT: Yeah, yeah, I know. I've gone through the exhibit that's attached to the -- actually did it to the first settlement agreement and looked at all of the names in the well ban class and fringe class because I knew I had those other two pending suits, and so I somewhat made some calculations of my own regarding the number of individuals who are in the well ban class and also in the fringe class.

MR. SHEMIN: Right. Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SHEMIN: Judge, I think it's important. I just want to take a moment because some issues have been raised about how I got involved in this case to begin with. I was in a business meeting. A gentleman by the name of Scott Day, who I did not know, who lived in Fort Smith and had a house in the impacted area, actually on the fringe, told me and a client about his situation. As a result of that communication at that point in time, I was asked and did conduct an interview with Mr. Day with respect to his situation. I also did due diligence with respect to the overall situation here in Fort Smith with respect to Whirlpool. And at that point in time,

to file a class action complaint in this matter. And that's based upon my years of experience handling class actions and also individual cases. I thought that we could meet the Rule 23 requirements at that point in time, and I also knew from my experience, Your Honor, that this was going to be a very expensive piece of litigation and that if it was to proceed on an individual basis, there might be a substantial number of people that were left behind, and as evidenced by the numbers today that I presented to the Court, and you have your own numbers, there would be a number of people, a substantial number of people that would be left behind if there's not a class action settlement. Once I filed my complaint in state court, and obviously it's been removed, once I filed my complaint, I had a deluge of phone calls from -- because it attracted some press. Obviously, Judge, what I did at that point in time was to just inform people that called me about the class action process, and I told those people that they were free to call me and that I would be responsive throughout. About a week later, Your Honor, I read the newspaper and I learned that Mr. Ledbetter and Mr. Woods had filed some individual actions. I called W. H. Taylor, who's a friend, a colleague, and a partner of Rick Woods, and briefly discussed it with him, got on the phone with Rick Woods, and then we got on the phone with Mr. Ledbetter and we discussed the potential of working together. I have the highest personal regard for

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Mr. Ledbetter. I think he is an excellent attorney and I think he does a great job in his areas of practice. And I feel the same about Mr. Woods. There's no problem insofar as the fact that Mr. Ledbetter and Mr. Woods chose to take a different route and did not want to join in the class action process. Obviously, Judge, the thing I didn't want to do, because it would not be appropriate, was to sign up people that called me when they called me for me to represent them on a personal basis. I don't think that's appropriate under the circumstances, and when I filed the class action complaint, Your Honor, everybody in this courtroom knows on this side of the rail that I have a responsibility to the class. And if I want to be relieved of that responsibility of the class, I have to come see you about that. So there's been a reference to the fact, Your Honor, that I only represent two people. I've always taken the position, Your Honor, that I represent the putative class, depending upon what the Court does in class certification. I also want to point out to the Court that based upon my experience and my due diligence in connection with this case, I was hopeful that at some point during the litigation process that Whirlpool and the putative class could work out a settlement rather than going through protracted litigation. That was on my mind from the beginning because of the way I viewed liability in this case. And I quickly gleaned through, you know, numerosity, commonality, superiority, and

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all the other aspects of what it takes to certify a class. I felt like in the end that a good settlement could be worked out for everyone involved. Now, I completely understand that Mr. Ledbetter and Mr. Woods want to go in a different direction, and I totally understand their position, and they are free, obviously, along with their clients, to go in a different direction, but it's important to me and I'll go through the process to explain, and I know you've read the settlement, reviewed it, understand my state of mind as I negotiated this settlement with Whirlpool. First of all, I want you to know that we had protracted discussions throughout the term of this lawsuit up to today's date. We worked diligently. This class action settlement just didn't happen. We've met. I've met with Mr. Jones. I've met with Mr. Morrison who was the predecessor to Mr. Brunson. And we have talked in detail about the possibilities of getting a resolution of this case. Let me tell you what my understanding of the law is, and I'm sure that Mr. Ledbetter and the Court will correct me if I'm wrong. Here's the way I view this case. The AMI instructions and the Felton case, which was where Mr. Ledbetter was the late counsel in that case, and it's an important opinion, differentiate between the permanent injury of the land and a temporary injury to the land, to the property. I view this case, based on the Felton decision and based upon what I know about this case, to be a temporary

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injury to land. And the reason for that is --

THE COURT: Do you even know that now if the, if the, if the ADEQ is still in the middle of determining what the, what the remediation is going to do?

MR. SHEMIN: Well, Your Honor, the reason that I feel that way is because, obviously, it could be a jury decision. It could be your decision. It will ultimately be your decision. But the reason I feel that way is the reliance on Felton developed by Mr. Ledbetter. What I understand the holding in part in that case is that if ADEQ, if the state and Whirlpool are going through this remediation process, then there's the presumption that there has to be remediation, that it's capable of being remediated, and if it's capable of being remediated, then you go to the temporary injury to property as opposed to the permanent injury to property.

THE COURT: Why then does Whirlpool need an access easement for 20 years?

MR. SHEMIN: Well, because we don't know, Your Honor, what problems are going to be occurring during the remediation process. It has to be determined what the exact remediation process will be, and things happen during the remediation process that might require additional work.

THE COURT: Yeah. That's one of the big problems I see with this, with this class action. By the way, I want to say I want you to proceed. I've got a lot of questions that

I'm going to ask both parties, and I don't mean to interrupt 1 2 you, but --3 MR. SHEMIN: Yeah, Judge --4 THE COURT: -- and because I want to have a free flow 5 of exchange here and I want to hear what you want to tell the 6 Court, so --7 MR. SHEMIN: No. And I appreciate the questions 8 because that's why I'm here, to answer your questions. That's 9 more important than anything for me to answer your questions. 10 THE COURT: But your thought process about how you 11 went about settling the case is important because I note a 12 couple of things; one, Miss Wilson did not become a plaintiff 13 in the case until the day before the settlement. 14 MR. SHEMIN: That's correct, Your Honor. And the 15 reason -- may I give you the reason for that? 16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 MR. SHEMIN: Yeah, the reason for that is when you're 18 looking at a motion for class certification and you're defining 19 classes and subclasses, you need to have, in my opinion, a 20 member of each class in order to properly present --THE COURT: Yeah, but she's a member of the well ban 21 22 class. She is the most important plaintiff. I mean, at the 23 time you negotiated this settlement, and I don't know what 24 Miss Wilson's involvement is or her time involvement, the only

client you had was the fringe member of the class. Now, the

further thing, what I don't understand, reading your complaint, what you -- you describe the class, and I'll not go back and read the complaint, but all those property owners who have been affected by the TCE contamination. Now, the class, though, now is defined as well bore [sic] and fringe class members. How did you come to your --

MR. SHEMIN: Your Honor, I didn't follow what you said.

THE COURT: Okay. You've got, the class in the settlement is divided into two subclasses.

MR. SHEMIN: Correct.

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THE COURT: You've got the well ban class and you've got the fringe class. How did you arrive at that class definition that's different than the allegation that you have in your complaint?

MR. SHEMIN: Your Honor, the way I arrived at that or we arrived at it in the context of this negotiation is because it encompasses a hundred percent of those impacted and that could potentially be impacted.

THE COURT: Well, but in your fringe class, it provides that if, you know, if they discover that there's contamination on the fringe, then it becomes basically a well ban member and it has those remedies the well ban members have that the fringe classes members don't have.

MR. SHEMIN: That's correct.

1 THE COURT: Okay. What happens to the property owner 2 on the other side of the fringe class owner? Do they -- you 3 know, they are not in the case. Are they impacted? I'm just trying to figure out who is impacted by this settlement. 4 5 MR. SHEMIN: Right. Well, Your Honor --6 THE COURT: You've come up with this definition of 7 well ban and fringe. 8 MR. SHEMIN: Your Honor, there has to be some line of 9 demarcation. 10 THE COURT: Yeah. 11 MR. SHEMIN: You've got the well ban, you've got the 12 fringe, and how far you can extend it. 13 THE COURT: Why does the fringe even need to be in the 14 class if there's no trespass on their property? 15 MR. SHEMIN: Because, well, first of all, Scott Day is 16 a fringe class member and he feels like and I've always felt 17 like that those people on the fringe need to be protected 18 within reason. 19 THE COURT: I need to ask a question about Mr. Day. 20 MR. SHEMIN: Sure. THE COURT: And I've read all of these pleadings and 21 22 I've got a lot of questions, and let me ask you about Mr. Day. 23 When I saw that he was the plaintiff and I looked at the 24 settlement agreement, I looked on the fringe class, I don't see 25 his name there. So I'm trying to figure out who he is. Well,

I find out that he is -- has an LLC called River Rock Holdings, LLC. So what I did, I went to the -- it's real easy. You can do this in about two minutes. You can go to the Sebastian County website and can look and see. Does he own this property or does River Rock Holdings own it?

MR. SHEMIN: He owns it through that entity.

THE COURT: How can he -- that is a separate legal entity. How can Scott Day be a plaintiff?

MR. SHEMIN: Well, in his -- Your Honor, that can easily be corrected. He's the real property party in interest.

THE COURT: Now, wait a minute, Mr. Shemin. You filed this lawsuit. You alleged that Scott Day was the owner of this property. He is not the owner of the property.

MR. SHEMIN: That's, that's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's River Rock Holdings, LLC. Now, I don't even know if River Rocks Holding, LLC, can be a class representative, an LLC. I mean, I'm not -- you-all are more versed in class actions than I am. But, I mean, Scott Day is not even the real party in interest.

MR. SHEMIN: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: He is by virtue, he is a member, but I don't know if there are other members of this LLC.

MR. SHEMIN: Your Honor, the way I understand the rules, if and when someone raises the issue of whether or not someone is a real party in interest, then it can be corrected

with leave of Court, so I don't think anybody --

THE COURT: But the allegation in the complaint -- he does not own the property.

MR. SHEMIN: Well, that's correct, Your Honor, but he is the -- I believe he's the sole member of that LLC.

THE COURT: The other thing I looked at, I mean, you are going to have to pardon me for my inquisitiveness here, but I went and looked at the Secretary of State's record and it shows his status as barred. The LLC is not even current, which means he hasn't paid his franchise taxes.

MR. SHEMIN: Well, I would have to discuss that with Mr. Day.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think that there's, I think that there's a problem with him individually. If he were to convey the property to himself individually and own it, but I mean, you negotiated this settlement at a time when Scott Day, he didn't even own the property, and he was your main client, and I don't know when Miss Wilson became your client, but if she only became a plaintiff in this litigation the day before the settlement was made, the Court has some real questions about who really negotiated this settlement.

MR. SHEMIN: Your Honor, I negotiated the settlement, Your Honor, on behalf of the putative class.

THE COURT: I know, I know you did.

MR. SHEMIN: And, Your Honor, I think, very

respectfully, the inquiry from my perspective would be this.

My job would be to negotiate and at relevant times to sit down with the class or the class representatives, the putative class representatives, and discuss the proposed settlement and get their input, and which I did with both Mr. Day and with

Miss Wilson to explain it to them in detail, and to have them tell me if they have agreed or disagreed, and if they disagreed in any way, in any material way whatsoever, then it would be my job not to proceed, because I don't get to run this show. My clients get to determine whether or not they believe it's appropriate. And, Judge, I would just tell you this again very, very respectfully. It's not in my experience atypical, when you're trying to create classes and subclasses, to bring in additional class representatives so that you make sure that there's representations --

THE COURT: But Mrs. Wilson, though, is -- I mean, she is in the well ban class. That is the -- that is the core of the case. Those people whose -- that there's evidence now that their property has been contaminated. I mean, you allege a trespass and --

MR. SHEMIN: Well, I hope the Court wouldn't view Miss Wilson as being disqualified --

THE COURT: No, I don't, but --

MR. SHEMIN: -- just because she came in late, later in the game.

THE COURT: Well, no, I had these others -- I'm going to tell you, Mr. Shemin, I have the highest regard for you as a lawyer. We've handled cases together when I was in private practice and you were an outstanding lawyer, and I don't for a moment think that you did anything that was collusion or anything in dealing with this. I know you were an advocate for your clients' very best interests, so don't infer from my questions that I think that you somehow short-changed your duty as a lawyer to these Plaintiffs, because I know that you are doing the best that you can for them.

MR. SHEMIN: Thank you, Your Honor. But I would welcome you questioning me in this manner, because it gives me the opportunity to let you know what my state of mind is and was at the time. Can I proceed?

THE COURT: Yeah. Go ahead.

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MR. SHEMIN: Judge, this is what I was driving at. If you look at the temporary injury to the property, let's just assume that's what we have at the end of the day. Under the AMI instruction, under the guidance from the Felton case, the damages would be the -- would be the cost of the repair, the restoration, the remediation plus the loss of use and enjoyment. It would not be the diminution of the fair market value which would be the standard under the permanent injury. Now, here's what my rationale is for the settlement. I believe, I started off, Your Honor, with the thought that if

this is a temporary injury to property, we are going to get the restoration, because I'm relying upon the State of Arkansas through ADEQ to make sure that there is an appropriate restoration of all the property as a result of those that are impacted. But what I negotiated with Whirlpool in good faith is that these putative class members -- let's talk about the well ban class. They are going to get -- well ban class is going to get the diminution in fair market value. Now, let me -- so what we are doing, Your Honor, is I've got the restoration covered, and then I'm going over and getting the diminution in fair market value of the property. Now, here's the point. It could be argued, and Mr. Ledbetter has done so in his usual eloquence, that the tax assessor's diminution is not appropriate. The way this settlement is crafted, Your Honor, if the, if the independent appraiser does not think that the tax assessor got it right, then the independent appraiser for the well ban class, and later on for the fringe class, can supplant the tax assessor's opinion. Now, the reason I felt comfortable, Your Honor, in going with and putting in the tax assessor's opinion, is because when I came to Sebastian County and filed this complaint in state court, while I was in the courthouse, I went to see the assessor. And I sat down with her and we had a good conversation about it. Since that point in time, Your Honor, I've talked to Page Kutait, who is an appraiser, and I think that their methodology, their thinking

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in terms of how they wanted to make the adjustment was appropriate. But again, Your Honor, let me emphasize to you that this is not a situation where anyone has to solely rely upon the tax assessor.

THE COURT: Well, you know, you've done enough class actions, you know where the experience is, is that most people get these ten-page notices, and they -- in this case they may look at them, but, you know, most people don't, just don't respond, they don't do anything, so the default option here is the appraisal by the assessor. Now, we know in Arkansas that -- I mean, I looked at the tax assessment on my property. Actually, the language in your settlement agreement talks about assessment value. Assessed value is 20 percent of the appraised value. And it's the appraised value that's in question here, although the settlement agreement calls it the assessed value.

MR. SHEMIN: That's correct.

THE COURT: So it's really the appraised value. But appraisals are done just for the purposes of taxes, and when people, and particularly I know historically around here, even with my own residence, that the tax assessor's appraisal of property, especially of older homes and not new construction, is far below what the real market is because the whole purpose of it is just to determine what the ad valorem taxes are, because you take the assessed value, you take the tax

assessor's appraised value, take 20 percent of that and that determines the value for calculating the ad valorem at that tax, so to say that the tax assessor's appraisal is the accurate fair market value is probably not the case. However, it's -- they are relative numbers here, because if they are reducing by 50 percent or whatever, it's 50 percent of a number is what it is.

MR. SHEMIN: But, Judge, I -- may I interrupt you just a second?

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. SHEMIN: Judge, if I implied or expressed in any way whatsoever that I think that the tax assessor's value is the fair market value, then I don't mean to communicate that to the Court. What I tried to do here, Your Honor, was arrive at a compromise. It was not a capitulation. It was a compromise. And what I was trying to find was an objective benchmark for the benefit of the class so that we would have something to work with to move forward. But if class members do not like the tax assessor's option, then they can default to the independent appraisal and I think --

THE COURT: Who gets the independent appraiser for the landowner?

MR. SHEMIN: Pardon me?

THE COURT: Who selects the independent appraiser for the landowner?

MR. SHEMIN: The putative class members each have the opportunity to select, subject to the qualifications.

Whirlpool --

THE COURT: I saw those qualifications. How in the world are you going to find an appraiser around here that fits those kind of qualifications?

MR. SHEMIN: Your Honor, can I go back to my history with Whirlpool?

THE COURT: Yeah.

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MR. SHEMIN: Okay. The reason I find it not difficult to accomplish that is because I've known the people that I've -- the person that I would recommend to the putative class members would be Richard Stephens. He is an MAI appraiser in Little Rock. I have known him for years and years and years and I know he's eminently qualified and I know he's one of the top MAI appraisers in the country. And so I have full confidence that he and others like him would be able to find qualified appraisers. That's the least thing, very respectfully, that I'm worried about because I'm called upon in my practice to, to use appraisers and be very familiar with the appraisal process, and so that's been my experience that we can find top flight appraisers. Now, this is important to me, Judge. The reason that this mechanism was so important to me as the putative class counsel is because Whirlpool pays for all of the appraisals. They don't get to make the decision as to who's

going to get to be the independent appraiser or who's going to be the appraiser selected by each putative class member, but they have to pay for it. And if you'll allow me at this point to follow through, but please interrupt me as I go through --

THE COURT: No. Go ahead.

MR. SHEMIN: Because my logic is on trial today and, for better or worse, I want to explain what it is so that you'll know my thought process. I told you about the remediation. I don't think it's unreasonable for the putative class members to rely upon ADEQ for restoration. But we are gaining the opportunity to get the diminution in fair market value, maybe not a hundred percent, but we have that opportunity through the mechanism for the well ban class and later on for the fringe class, as we will discuss. And then, Your Honor, the question becomes what else? In addition to the restoration, in addition to the fair market value analysis that will hopefully be accomplished, in addition to that, Your Honor, we've got a bump of one-third.

THE COURT: Why did you change -- the original settlement agreement just left it open and it looked like it had what I've learned recently is called a clear sailing provision, what's called a clear sailing provision on the attorneys' fees where the Defendant agrees not to object to, to the fee award. And now you've changed it and just added 33 percent to the top of what you originally negotiated in the

settlement.

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MR. SHEMIN: This is critically important and I'm glad there are a number of people here because there's one promise that I have made to everybody that I've talked to, and that is, and I wish Mr. Ledbetter and I had had the opportunity to talk about this issue. I have told everyone that the least important thing in this class action is the attorney fees. And let me explain. I'm not looking for a percentage. I've told Whirlpool that I'm not looking for a percentage of recovery. As a matter of fact, I am on record with you today that if I receive anything, the only application that I would be making for attorney fees is a reduced hourly rate with a cap of a hundred thousand dollars if, if I reach that, if I reach it.

THE COURT: Well, there's criteria, and I've done this before, to determine what fees are, and you don't need to be in here limiting yourself to what your fee is going to be right now, if this matter eventually gets approved. I was somewhat intrigued in how that changed and --

MR. SHEMIN: I need to look you in the eye and tell you, and I appreciate your comment, but that is where I began this journey and that's where, respectfully, if we proceed, if we proceed, we are going to wind up, because I've made a commitment personally and professionally to try to help these people out. And I have never done any class action with maybe one exception where I've ever asked for anything, and I've done

numerous, other than my hourly rate. I've not -- I'm not interested -- I'm interested, obviously, in the Lodestar, but I'm not interested in any enhancement. That's not why I do these class actions. I do these things because it is important to me to give back and to help, and Mr. Ledbetter can go in his direction and I know he's going to do a great job --

THE COURT: We are getting a little ahead of ourselves here.

MR. SHEMIN: Well, let me explain. And then, Judge, beyond -- because I had to consider when I got that one-third bump negotiated, then the question becomes I know that in addition to restoration, in addition to fair market value, we've got a one-third bump, and there's going to be a small, relatively small amount of attorney fees, if any, that would come out, and the beneficiaries of that are going to be the people in this courtroom. That's important to me. And then there's two sides of the ledger, Your Honor, and this is also extremely important for the Court to consider. It's not just what you recover. It's what you save in making the recovery. And I understand Mr. Ledbetter and I understand the due diligence process in terms of fact that discovery hasn't been completed and there may be a myriad of different issues --

THE COURT: Has discovery even commenced?

MR. SHEMIN: No, but I know --

THE COURT: You haven't done any discovery at all?

MR. SHEMIN: I haven't. I don't need, Judge --

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THE COURT: One of the issues here is Rule 23(a), whether it meets those requirements, and I don't think -- some discovery might be required to determine that.

MR. SHEMIN: Well, Your Honor, and I'll explain. assuming from our perspective that, and this is just for settlement purposes, not just a walk through, but I'm assuming that there will be an admitted liability situation in my mind, that liability would not be contested, and that's why my focus, Your Honor, is on the damage component, and that's why I wanted to explain to you the rationale as to how I analyze damages and that's what I'm attempting to do now, because what I would like to make clear to the Court that once we have liability established, and we've talked about the damages, I'm not interested in getting into a position where I'm hiring appraisers, I'm hiring experts to duplicate work or maybe give a different opinion on the environmental issues. What I'm trying to do -- that are going to run up into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. If the Court says -- believes that I need to do that, then I'll do it, because I'm committed to the class action, but I don't see the economic benefit to the putative class for me to drain the resources for what they might recover because those, those costs, Your Honor, are not going to be paid directly by the Defendant in this lawsuit. I cannot recover those costs, unless I negotiate for that. And

in addition, Your Honor, it's just clear to me that it's not --I respect the way that Mr. Ledbetter and Mr. Woods are proceeding, but in this case with the backing of the State of Arkansas, I just do not think it's necessary, because what we are going to do is rely upon ADEQ doing its job with respect to the restoration and what's reasonably necessary under the circumstances. And Whirlpool obviously does not get to dictate what the final outcome of that is going to be, and nothing precludes, as I understand it, Your Honor, the putative class members from making -- from sharing their voice with the State of Arkansas with respect to the remediation process as it goes forward through ADEQ. And so I'm relying upon that. Now, I will tell you what in my view we're giving up in terms of the class action proposed settlement. As Mr. Ledbetter's pointed out, we have, in my mind, I have analyzed, you know, the punitive damage aspect of these cases and the class as a whole, and I've looked at that and I factored that into my thinking about the case.

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THE COURT: Isn't one of your claims fraudulent concealment?

MR. SHEMIN: Yes, Your Honor, but that, the issue there would be the defense of statute of limitations which has been raised and I anticipate would be an issue, although --

THE COURT: It will also be an issue regarding punitive damages, too, if they concealed this contamination.

MR. SHEMIN: Yes; right.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. SHEMIN: But in my way of thinking, Your Honor, and this is just Ken Shemin, rarely do I fail to settle a case if I get a good enough settlement for my clients based upon the prospect of punitive damages. That's just my benchmark. I'm not being critical of anybody else that uses different --

THE COURT: It's definitely a wild card.

MR. SHEMIN: Right, right. So I just wanted to let the Court know what my thinking was in that regard. Your Honor, I believe, obviously, that we would have numerosity, commonality, typicality. I believe it's --

THE COURT: Let's dwell on this numerosity here. We already know that -- let me look at my -- out of the -- and, and I don't have any individuals I'm dealing with, but because, excuse me, the exhibits deal in parcels, not individuals, but I went through here and looked at these myself to try to figure out who these individuals are and I know my numbers can't be right, but, anyway, they are an approximation anyway.

MR. SHEMIN: Having worked with you, I trust your judgment.

THE COURT: Well, we can look at it and figure it out. But out of the 53 properties, Mr. Ledbetter represents individuals who own 34 of those properties, 34 of the 53 properties, and based on my numbers here, that leaves 14

individuals in the well ban class that are, that are, that are possibly -- that are currently unrepresented at this time except as putative class members.

MR. SHEMIN: Would it be 14 or 19, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, I stand to be corrected, but I just went through and 14 is the number that I came up with. Then, of the 51 -- and by the way, you know, when you look at these two classes, and I think there may be conflicts between these subclasses here, but you've got -- the bulk of the recovery goes to the well ban class. The fringe class represents only like ten percent of the value of the well ban class as far as the damages go. And there are 50 -- based on this exhibit to the original, and the reason I'm using the one from the original settlement, maybe the one from the amended settlement changed, I don't know if it did or not, but I marked it up on this --

MR. SHEMIN: I don't think so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But, anyway, there are ten opt-outs that leaves, what I've got, maybe 31 individuals in the fringe class, so, anyway, the -- so we are dealing with a relatively small class.

MR. SHEMIN: That's true, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And then there's the -- there's some case law -- I don't think there's authority probably anymore -- there's a presumption if there are over 40 members, then, you

know, it's possibly a class, but I don't think that's probably the law anymore. I know the Eighth Circuit has a view that there's not a particular number that there has to be. You have to look at the facts and circumstances of each case. But I do know when you've got, you've got the bulk of the well ban class, which are the people who we know have been injured based on the information we have to date, that there's been a trespass on their property through this TCE contamination, you know, 34 of those properties are — indicate — and I'm going ask Mr. Ledbetter this, you know, he says maybe. I want to know if — he doesn't even have to tell me they are going to opt out, because not until I certify the case and they actually opt out would that in fact occur, but it looks like the bulk of the well ban class members are not even going to be a part of the class.

MR. SHEMIN: But -- may I speak, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SHEMIN: Your Honor, and, again, this is -- I'm not trying -- I'm not here to challenge Mr. Ledbetter, his legal position, and/or his integrity about what might happen. What I am here to do, Your Honor, is to tell you two things; number one, I think it is critically important that nobody be left behind, and my experience in doing these class actions, Your Honor, is that there are a number, a significant number of people that will do absolutely nothing and receive no benefit

whatsoever because they are concerned about signing a contract with a private attorney that says that they are going to be responsible for a third of any recovery and expenses, whether those expenses are ever collected or not. The reality, and we all know this in this courtroom here, Your Honor, that people react to that. People don't want to be exposed to substantial costs in connection with protracted litigation, and what I'm trying to do, Your Honor, is to make sure that those people who are reticent have a voice in trying to protect themselves and their interests and their property. And that's an important component.

THE COURT: That is an important component, but, you know, but individuals have to assert their own legal rights, you know, they would have to make their own choice about whether they want to pursue that, but, you know, the purpose of the class action is that you have, you have a potential class with common issues of fact in law, and it's so numerous that it is a superior method to adjudicate the claims, and that's one of the questions here is whether or not this is a superior method to adjudicate these claims and whether joinder is impracticable, not impossible but impracticable.

MR. SHEMIN: Exactly, Your Honor, and I think in my opinion, very respectfully, this case is well-suited because — let me explain. On the issue of liability, I don't know how there can be more common questions of law and fact with respect

to the class. I mean, to me that's a simple analysis, and maybe I'm just missing it, Your Honor. From the liability side, we know that Whirlpool has a major problem here in Fort Smith. And we know that it has emanated -- where it's emanated from and we know within reason the extent of the contamination, and so to me those issues of, those common issues of law and fact pertaining to the liability side are easy to get to. Now, with respect to the damage side, Your Honor, what we've tried to do in recognizing the class action requirements is to devise methodology that's well suited and takes little or no intervention on the Court's part to effectuate.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this about, you know, there are four prerequisites for class certification; numerosity, commonality, typicality, and the class representatives are fairly and adequately protected, the interests of the class.

Okay. Those are the four considerations here. Now, one of the -- the settlement agreement -- and we are going to go kind of back and forth between the settlement agreement and this issue about the prerequisites for certification -- is that one of the considerations that the well ban parties are giving up is a -- which is the covenants. They can't drill wells, but, also, they are giving an access easement.

MR. SHEMIN: Right.

THE COURT: Now, I will tell you this. I read that notice. I don't think that notice anywhere comes close to

informing a class member about what could possibly happen to their property. That access easement is, you know, this, this is not, this is basic property law, but that easement becomes the dominant estate, and we've dealt with a lot of oil and gas litigation around here and we know that whoever owns the rights of ingress and egress has the right to go through there and do what they want to with the property. Now, you know, I don't know where these -- I looked at these maps and I can't tell anything from the maps that are attached to the exhibits here to the complaint. I don't know where ADEQ is saying that these wells need to go. But then a landowner who has a monitoring well in his backyard is going to be different from the neighbor three doors down that and doesn't have anything at all and, and his damage is going to be different, yet, he's being paid the same thing as the neighbor three doors down.

MR. SHEMIN: Correct. Your Honor, to me it boils down to -- if you see flaws, obviously, I commit --

THE COURT: I'm not looking for flaws.

MR. SHEMIN: But, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I'm looking at your settlement agreement and I'm trying to figure out what it is, and I have tell you what -- I have a lot of concern about what that notice says because I do not see -- in this case remediation should be about as broad as they can be, and we know, and you alluded to this yourself, ADEQ is the one that controls what's going be

done. They are going to tell Whirlpool what they are going to have to do.

MR. SHEMIN: Correct.

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THE COURT: Once Whirlpool has access to those properties.

MR. SHEMIN: Correct.

THE COURT: The problem is Whirlpool can't go out there and put monitoring wells right now because they don't have access to the property and, but once they do, and in the last pleading I saw something about soil vapor tests. I don't know even know what that is or what that involves, but it looks like to me that you don't know -- it may be in the documents. I looked at that, that agency decision, and I can't make heads or tails out of it. Anyway, if I read it, I'm not sure I would understand it, but there -- what the remedy that Whirlpool is looking for and you're giving up is you're giving an access easement in perpetuity. That means -- for 20 years. means that Whirlpool -- if ADEQ says, "go put a monitoring well, dig out that backyard, remove the swimming pool because we want the monitoring well to go right there." Do you think that the landowner who gets that notice is adequately informed that that's what might happen to his property?

MR. SHEMIN: Well, Your Honor, those are good points that need to be addressed, and part of the process, as I understand it, is that we are here today to discuss any of the

issues of concern of any of the potential objectors.

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THE COURT: You know, this to me is a done deal, a settlement, and that's the way these things are done. And, you know, and I'm asked just to sign off on this and rubber stamp it and send it on, which I'm not going to do, because I'm looking at all of these different issues. There's a question about, you know, I'm looking at the prerequisites for class certification and I think that, you know, and actually it goes to the Rule 23(e)(3). I can't remember if I've got -- it's actually 23(b)(3) where the -- where it's required that the questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over questions to only individual members, and that's what I think is possibly -- what this access easement does, hits that right on the head because landowners are not going to be treated the same way under this access agreement. And I don't know -- and the other, the other thing, last night I was looking at that agency decision and it looks like to me ADEQ is giving them two years to figure out if this remedy they have is going to work. If it doesn't work, they are going to try something else.

MR. SHEMIN: Right.

THE COURT: Now, that's in the future. We don't know what that's going to be. Hopefully it's going to be nothing. Hopefully the remedy they are doing right now is going to work.

MR. SHEMIN: Right.

THE COURT: But if it doesn't work, and they are

holding -- and what Whirlpool is getting out of this deal, they are getting unfettered access to all of the property in the well ban class and unfettered access to the fringe class. And the fringe class members -- I looked, I looked at that, I looked at that so-called mutual covenant -- or I can't remember what it is. It's really -- what it is is unilateral. It may be mutual. Either one of them can invoke it, but if there's evidence of contamination on the property, that fringe member, for \$5,000, is giving up complete access of his property to Whirlpool to go out there and do whatever they need to remediate the property.

MR. SHEMIN: May I speak, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SHEMIN: Your point --

THE COURT: I don't mean -- I want you to speak freely anytime. You don't need to say anything about interrupting me.

MR. SHEMIN: Well, now, Judge, I appreciate your comment, and I'm not trying to be argumentative with the Court. Again, I just want to explain what we are attempting to do and, obviously, Judge, you bring up excellent points, and these things need to be addressed, but let me explain what the rationale is because I can understand how you got to this issue with mutuality. The consideration is obviously relatively small because, for the fringe class, the \$5,000 plus the one-third bump, because there is a plan, if they do get

impacted in the future, and that's the mutuality aspect of it.

So I just didn't want the Court to think that I didn't consider that.

THE COURT: I know that they didn't get the diminution in value just like the well ban class. Basically they become a well ban class member, in essence, even though they are called the fringe class.

MR. SHEMIN: That's correct, Your Honor, out into the future --

THE COURT: It's obvious why Whirlpool wants that.

MR. SHEMIN: Pardon?

THE COURT: The reason Whirlpool wants that, they want access to all of that property out there, because ADEQ is telling them, you know, you need to negotiate with these people and do something. Obviously, they must be telling them that they are not -- I'm sure Mr. Ledbetter's clients probably are telling them, no, you can't have access to my property. Whirlpool's got a big problem here.

MR. SHEMIN: They have a problem.

THE COURT: They have got a big problem here, and the parties need to get it resolved. I mean, they are making -you know, when I first got this settlement agreement and looked at it, it looked like a pretty good way to try to resolve this problem. It really did. But the more I got into it, I saw the problems with it. You know, I'm having some real questions

about it, but I want to hear out from all the parties. I haven't had a chance to hear from Whirlpool yet. I'm sure they have got some answers to some of these questions, but I have some concern about whether the -- and I think this is -- although it says that the, that the claims and defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of the class, and they may not be typical if the parties -- if the class members are impacted differently --

MR. SHEMIN: Judge, may I again --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SHEMIN: -- tell you my state of mind? What we typically see in these class actions are a situation where there may be common questions of law and fact with respect to liability. And then where you get into issues in class certification that we don't have in this case is reliance. We don't have in it in this case, but then the damage component, because people's damages would be different, and so what I attempted to do, Your Honor, with Whirlpool's cooperation, is to have a mechanism in place for the damages. That was extremely important. I mean, I could ask you to certify respectfully a class on the liability issue and not get the damages issue. I could ask for a myriad of different things, but what I wanted to do was present a package for the benefit of the putative class as extensive as I could reasonably do so, because that gets us to the fringe and how far you carry out

the fringe, so that everybody knew what they were entitled to. And the other thing I will tell you, Your Honor, is that I do not handle these class actions where I just send out a notice and that's it. I mean, that's when my work begins. I mean, I have, for lack of a better term, town hall meetings. I'm available. My staff's available. We are very proactive. I will not, absolutely will not contact putative class members during — before something is negotiated unless it's for a very specific reason, but once, Your Honor, once there is a settlement or a potential settlement in place that where there is a notice that goes out, it's my job, it's absolutely positively my job, not Whirlpool's job, my job, to be available and my job to make sure that everybody who will communicate with me —

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question in regard to that, and I just thought about this since you talked about communication with class members that you're not reaching out and I understand that. Okay. Once this class gets certified and that notice goes out, they get this ten-page notice that is -- and I've seen a lot of these class actions, and I tell you the claims rate is low, even though I have lawyers tell me it's going be high. And it's low, and the reason I think it is low is they get ten pages of something they can't understand, and then -- but who are -- they have to decide whether to opt out? Who are they going to call? Are they going to call you

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MR. SHEMIN: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- ask you about the opt out and can you objectively advise them whether it is in their best interests to opt out or stay in the class?

MR. SHEMIN: That's exactly my job. I'm looking at Judge Roy. You know, Judge, I've done far more defense class actions than I have on the plaintiffs' side, but one of my first plaintiffs' class actions was against Edward D. Jones, and Judge Roy certified the class and we settled it immediately before the trial, and I will tell you that was a nationwide class action. And I think there were maybe 12 to 15,000 members of that class, and I did -- I devoted months of working and calling and communicating with these class members.

That's, that's the way I handle them. That's what I do. And whatever --

THE COURT: Well, what are you going to tell them when they call you up and say, what's, what's investigation of remediation mean in this access agreement? Am I going have a well in my backyard?

MR. SHEMIN: I'm going to tell them the truth. I don't know. Well, they are not, they are not going to have a well in their backyard. In fact --

THE COURT: They might --

MR. SHEMIN: Let's talk about the common sense of it

though, Judge. How many of these people, and there are a great deal -- I don't anticipate, Your Honor, that many people in this area, in the impacted area, are going to want to dig when they have city water --

THE COURT: No, I'm talking about, I'm talking about monitoring wells.

MR. SHEMIN: Oh, yeah, the monitoring. I apologize.

THE COURT: Listen. There is no reason once everybody -- I just know that it costs so much more to drill your own water well than it does to get water from the city. So, I know -- the thing about the well ban people can't drill water wells out there doesn't bother me at all. But what I'm thinking about is ADEQ says you are going to have -- you go put a well in his backyard because we want to find out what the contours for this contamination are. And then they move the big drilling rig in the backyard and, you know, drill a well and then if, if, you know, there's not enough water pressure for the water coming up, then they put a pump out there. I mean, somebody might have that in their backyard.

MR. SHEMIN: They very well might. And that's the part of informed consent. I mean, that's what you have to do in order to get resolutions on a class-wide basis. I mean, Judge, the way I view the world, there's benefits and burdens. We make our decisions. There's benefits and burdens.

THE COURT: Yeah, you're right.

MR. SHEMIN: And people are free to opt out, and we can't respectfully just assume that people, if they are well advised, can't make decisions and nobody compels --

THE COURT: Let me ask you another question and this question is addressed more to Whirlpool than it is to you. You know, you negotiated this agreement with them, but if more than -- and this provision changed from the original to the final. It says that if 25 percent or more of the class opt out, then they can walk away from the deal. And we know -- I haven't run my numbers, but if it's not over 25 percent, it's going to be there real quickly. That if, if those people opt out, then Whirlpool can just walk away anytime.

MR. SHEMIN: Your Honor, clearly if there's more than 25 percent, they can walk away. Absolutely. But it's also been my experience that sometimes, not all the time, but sometimes there's negotiations about that 25 percent, and this is important to me, Judge, if a hundred percent of Sam and Rick's clients opt out, I'm fighting -- I'm concerned for those people that don't have counsel, and let me explain that to you.

THE COURT: That's your best argument, those left behind.

MR. SHEMIN: Let me explain that to you, Judge, because this is important. This is very important to me. I mean, as I indicated to you, Judge, I have had numerous discussions -- numerous discussions with putative class members

as a result of filing the lawsuit, and then I think there's people that are in this courtroom that I've had discussions with, and I want to make sure that those people who do not want to hire an individual lawyer or law firm to represent them have the opportunity, through some mechanism, to receive redress and they just don't let it go and not get what I believe that they are entitled to, and it's not going to be perfect. It's going to be negotiated. And by virtue of the fact that it's a compromise, we don't receive everything, but there's a mechanism in place where there's consideration, a price bargained for, and paid for a promise, and that's what I'm trying to achieve on behalf of the class members. Okay.

THE COURT: Okay, good.

MR. SHEMIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. I may have some more questions for you because -- but not now. Let's go ahead and let's give Whirlpool an opportunity to speak. Mr. Jones.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, if it's okay with the Court,

I'm going to talk about five or ten minutes just to do a little
initial introduction of Mr. Brunson.

THE COURT: Okay. That will be fine.

MR. JONES: Please the Court, counsel. As the Court knows, this is a preliminary fairness review and the hearing is to determine whether or not it's fairness. The question, as I understand it from the cases, is this settlement within a range

that could be or zone that could be in a final approval? These TCE -- this TCE was used all over the United States by many manufacturing companies, so we have a history to look at. I've heard that -- the fact that there may be 20,000 plumes in the United States similar to this one. So we've got a history of about what type of diminution in value that is done to the property. And some of those studies I believe have been cited in the briefs. The range of decreased value on these cases across the country is somewhere between two and eight percent with the highest being around 20 percent. And in this case, Whirlpool has offered up to 75 percent plus a third --

THE COURT: Let me ask you about that 75 percent. Let me ask you about that 75 percent, because it's not 75 percent. Seventy-five percent of the value of the land and 50 percent for the value of the improvements and if you look at the -- and let me just take, for example, Mrs. Wilson's. The value of her land was \$3,200 and the improvements are \$28,100 after the appraisal. So the diminution, and I calculated it based on the numbers you have. The diminution in value that you are offering her is 55 percent; it's not 75 percent.

MR. JONES: Well, I said up to 75. Some of them are less, I understand.

THE COURT: Well, no, I don't think any of them -- I didn't see any of them up to 75 percent, but that's a little bit misleading to say that it's 75, because it's not anywhere

close to that.

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MR. JONES: Okay. I don't mean to mislead the Court --

THE COURT: I know you don't.

MR. JONES: Well, let's say it's 75 percent or 50 percent or 45 percent. Why would Whirlpool pay that much money when it's over twice as much as the juries award all across the country? And, Judge, I've been -- you know, I'm from Fort Smith. I went to Ballman. I went to Fort Smith Senior High. That shows my age because it's now Northside. I went to Ramsey. Both of my kids graduated from Southside. I've represented Whirlpool for 43 years, since 1973, and they have been a good client and I've asked -- I said -- I just don't see any jury awarding the type of damages, you know, more than this amount of money. And Jeff Noel I think has spoke before that Whirlpool has made a promise to the citizens of Fort Smith that we would do the right thing, and we are trying to do the right thing. I mean, we did it. We want to fix it. It wasn't on purpose. It was an accident. But there is a problem here and we want to correct it. We've got a remediation plan going, working with ADEQ. Those wells, I understand we've had 91 monitoring wells and it's my information that most of those wells, Judge, are on either Whirlpool property or in right-of-ways. I think there is less than ten of them that are actually on individuals' properties, and they have tried to put

those in places that were not too intrusive. Also, there's chemical treatment going on at the present time, as you mentioned, that's the two-year thing they are looking at to see if that is able to treat the source. I think you've got to consider when you are looking at this settlement, the fact that nobody's use of this property has been interfered with. I mean, not any, their use of the property. They are all on city There are no wells. Jenny Lind just recently got water. widened or I shouldn't say that. They are going to start widening Jenny Lind in January, I believe, the City is. Whirlpool recently sold the warehouse, trying to sell the manufacturing plant. But, you know, the studies show that years down the road, these property values are going to be higher or as equal to the pre-contamination level. Now, Mr. Ledbetter --

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THE COURT: Let me, let me understand that again. You say that it's Whirlpool's opinion that the values of these properties are going to be higher than --

MR. JONES: Equal to or higher years down the road because of the improvements that are going on and natural inflation.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. JONES: The -- we feel like that the objections that are being made are really not relevant and that they are premature. We don't know for certain that all of these people

are going to opt out. I mean, I don't see the harm in the Court going ahead and sending a notice to these people, and if the notice needs to be redone a little bit to correct any deficiencies, you know, we can do that. But what's, what's the downside of sending out the notices to find out? And if all of these people opt out, then that's -- you know, we will have to take another look at it. That's for sure.

Judge, I would like to introduce Robert Brunson, my co-counsel who I have been working with on this case. I've worked with Nelson Mullins for years. They are a great firm out of South Carolina. And he's going to do a Powerpoint presentation and go into much more detail, and he's in a better position to answer your questions.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Jones.

MR. BRUNSON: I'm waiting for the monitor.

THE COURT: We have them turned on, Jane Ann?

THE CLERK: Yes.

(Off the record briefly.)

MR. BRUNSON: Your Honor, I appreciate the Court's indulgence and due diligence in your questioning and welcome you to interrupt me at any point. I do have a Powerpoint here that I would like to walk through --

THE COURT: Let's go with that, and I'll try not to

interrupt you if there are any questions and then we can get back to -- because I do have a lot of questions. Okay. You may proceed.

MR. BRUNSON: I understand, Your Honor. And if I could start with a quick story, my late partner, Steve Morrison, was lead trial counsel in this case previously and unfortunately he passed away about a year ago. Mr. Morrison had a story that he liked to tell when it fit, and if it's okay with you --

THE COURT: Sure. Absolutely.

MR. BRUNSON: It's about a botany professor from
England who came over to Charleston, South Carolina, to be a
guest lecturer at the College of Charleston in the late 1700s.
He was met at the Port of Charleston, which, of course, was a
very small village at that time, by the President of the
College of Charleston and together they walked through the
market area, which was a cobblestone place where people came in
to sell their goods and trade from outside the city and from
inside the city, and as they walked together, there was a
cacophony of noises, as you can imagine, as people shouted bids
and asked for prices, and they had animals with them that they
were trying to sell and so forth, and the professor reached
into his pocket and pulled out a coin, and when he did, he
dropped coins onto the cobblestones, and as soon as those coins
hit the stones, everybody in the village stopped to see where

the coins were on the ground. And the professor turned to the college president and said, "How in the world did those people hear those stones -- those coins landing on the stones with all of this noise?" And the professor said, "People hear what they are listening for." And, Your Honor, I think it's important for us to be focused today on what we are listening for in this hearing. And if we could look at the first slide, this is a preliminary approval hearing, and as the Court is very well aware, preliminary approval simply means that the settlement is within the range of possible final approval. What the Court is looking at this with an eye of is that it's presumptively valid, and, of course, public policy strongly favors agreements and settlement agreements in class actions. And the Court is to find that the class action is not the product of fraud or collusion and that, taken as a whole, it is fair, adequate, and reasonable to all concerned. And, Your Honor, Whirlpool, as Mr. Jones indicated, has said all along it is very committed to the Fort Smith community and is really trying to do right by the residents of this area in making what we believe is a very generous settlement proposal. This was an overview of the manufacturing facility which Whirlpool operated in this community for about 45 years. On the next slide, we can see a close-up of the former degreaser building, and up above that to the north side is the well ban area. You see Ingersoll is the southernmost boundary. Jenny Lind over there on the right is

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the easternmost. Brazil is the north, and then Ferguson comes down on the left-hand side, and we believe that that former degreaser building is the source of the TCE contamination. Like Mr. Jones said, industry all over America used TCE as a degreaser in the 1960s and '70s without knowing that it had some negative issues when it was improperly disposed of, and Whirlpool was one of those companies. And we don't know exactly how the TCE got into the soil on that site, but it did. And we have to deal with it now. But the soil -- eventually, about 2001, Whirlpool realized that it had gotten into the ground water. It had gotten off site into this neighborhood right across Ingersoll Avenue from the Whirlpool facility. Now, the water table there is eight to 25 feet. That's not water, as the Court noted previously, that anyone would really be using for drinking water anyway at that shallow of a depth. And the plume is very well delineated with 90 plus water -ground water monitoring wells in the region, mostly on Whirlpool and public property, but some also on private property owned by these residents. And Whirlpool is now --THE COURT: How did Whirlpool negotiate easements with

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THE COURT: How did Whirlpool negotiate easements with some of those individuals who have private property north of the plant?

MR. BRUNSON: Right. Some of the residents have been willing to grant Whirlpool access to do ground water testing.

Some, very few, have been willing to allow for vapor monitoring

as well. And wherever Whirlpool has been able to negotiate an 1 agreement on a property that is located in an area where the 2 3 data would be meaningful to the remediation process, it has followed through on that. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. I note from some of the pleadings 6 that Whirlpool has reached settlement with some of the 7 landowners. Are those some landowners in the well -- who would be in the well ban area? 8 9 MR. BRUNSON: One is in the well ban area. Yes, both 10 are actually in the well ban area, right. 11 THE COURT: Do they have monitoring, do they have 12 monitoring wells on their property now? 13 MR. BRUNSON: They -- let's see. Miss Scroggins I 14 don't believe has a ground water monitoring well, but I'm not 15 positive. 16 THE COURT: That's okay. That's okay. 17 MR. BRUNSON: Both of them, Your Honor, did enter into 18 access agreements which are similar, if not identical, to what 19 is attached to the settlement agreement with the class. 20 THE COURT: Were they paid for the diminution in value 21 of their property in that settlement? 22 MR. BRUNSON: They were. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Were they paid anything else? What

was the total consideration in that settlement?

MR. BRUNSON: I'm glad to tell you that, Your Honor.

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I will tell you that both of the settlement agreements have confidentiality provisions, but I --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRUNSON: -- I want to answer your question --

THE COURT: Well, I think that the fact that you settled with two people in the well ban class, and I think that how you settled with them might have some relevance, would have some relevance, but, again, I think that kind of, kind of undercuts your argument about the commonality of the claims here. I think clearly the claim of trespass is common to all members. I think the theory of liability is common. It's, it's the claims for damages that are different that we have here.

MR. BRUNSON: Well, of course, the elements of the claims are different, but factually there's absolute commonality because it's the same TCE from the same source. The amounts vary. The properties in different locations vary, but that's not uncommon. In almost all environmental cases, you are going to have some difference, and it's fortunate in this settlement agreement, because we don't have the tax assessor's data, we are able to have a common methodology to resolve the claims of all the residents in the area as well.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, and, again, I'm sorry that I ask these questions as they come to my mind.

MR. BRUNSON: Please do.

I just have to apologize for -- it's the THE COURT: way I think. But the methodology came up using the tax assessor's appraisal, and as I noted, the appraisals historically are not fair market value of the property. But, but if you are taking fifty percent of a number, while it may affect what the bottom number is, if it's lower -- if your appraised value is lower than what real fair market value is, but, anyway, that, that mechanism that you, that you came up with, did you have discussions with the tax assessor about how they arrived at the diminution in the value? I mean, what -we got, we've got -- you know, most of the appraisals around here are done from a tax appraiser. Somebody drives by and looks at the house and it's not an in-depth appraisal. And so we got Becky Yandell, who is the tax assessor over there, who went through some numbers. What was her rationale for coming up with those numbers?

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MR. BRUNSON: Well, I haven't personally interviewed her or taken her deposition, so -- and, frankly, we think the tax assessor's devaluations on the property are extremely high, which would account for any degree to which their appraisal for tax assessment purposes is low. It's impossible to go -- not impossible but impractical to go to every single property to look at the appraisal done by the tax assessor and evaluate is this high, is this low for this particular property on this particular day? What we do have, though, here is certainty.

We know what that number is and the tax assessor came up with it prior to the contamination being more than publicly aware in May of 2013, and so we have that number that residents can know and rely on, and, importantly, if they don't like it, if they think that that number understates the fair market value of their property, they simply go the independent appraiser route, Your Honor, and they have an independent appraiser come in and calculate the damages based off of that number. And I think another important point there is, in the amended settlement agreement, we have added 33 percent on top of the diminution in value that Whirlpool is paying to these residents, and certainly that would more than account for it.

THE COURT: Now, that is -- now, let me understand that. Is the 33 percent is just an increase in that and then if the fees are less than 33 percent, the difference goes to the landowner or does it go back to Whirlpool?

MR. BRUNSON: No. It goes to the landowner. And, you know, after we negotiated the original settlement agreement with Mr. Shemin, and, by the way, we have had extensive discussions with Mr. Ledbetter over a period of many months and attempted to negotiate something that -- globally and we were unsuccessful in doing that --

THE COURT: That's why I put this hearing off for two months. I was hopeful that --

MR. BRUNSON: And, Your Honor, that's -- just to be

totally candid with you, that's where the additional 33 percent came in because we really wanted to incentivize Mr. Ledbetter's clients to participate in this agreement and not opt out, and so we added more money to the deal. It's that simple. And that would compensate them for the attorneys' fees, which, as you point out, should be substantially less than 33 percent, and their costs, which are minimal at this point, and give them --

THE COURT: I'm not, I'm not saying it should be less than 33 percent. I'm just saying that, you know, you've done a lot of these class actions and know that when you have a common fund -- actually the Eighth Circuit follows a rule that a percentage of the common fund is really kind of the determination for attorney fees, and the Eighth Circuit has pretty much kind of authorized a third. That's what that common fund is, but in some circumstances, it may be more appropriate for the Court to do a Lodestar calculation, which would, in a lot of respects, generates a lower fee, so we are getting ahead of ourselves on fees here, but you did explain something to me, and that is that if there was a Lodestar fee here and it was somewhat less than a third, that that stays with the landowner rather than going back to Whirlpool.

MR. BRUNSON: Right. And if you just take the number that Mr. Shemin volunteered to the Court, a hundred thousand dollars, that's less than three percent --

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MR. BRUNSON: -- so it's a good deal for the property owners.

THE COURT: I understand that, but I'm certainly not going to hold him to that because if he vigorously represents his clients, he ought to be compensated for the services he renders and not some cut fee that he's willing to take, but, anyway, let's get off of attorney fees. Move on to more important things.

MR. BRUNSON: All right. So I think it's important to note, Your Honor, in all of this that there is no health risk here that's been identified. This is a quote from the ADEQ Public Outreach and Assistant Division Chief, Katherine Benotti, Beninotti, and she said, about a year ago actually, the ground water is currently not being utilized for drinking water purposes. Provided the contaminated ground water is not used as a drinking water source, or the residents do not come in contact with the contaminated ground water, parenthetically don't touch it, don't drink it, there is no potential risk. The current levels of TCE in the ground water have not shown an unacceptable risk to vapor intrusion pathway. ADEQ has required Whirlpool to take appropriate remedial actions to mitigate the contamination of TCE in the ground water. are no health claims in the class action. There are no health claims asserted by any of Mr. Ledbetter's individual clients.

This is purely a case about property damage and remediation costs, and the other non-health claims of related damages. And so when Your Honor refers to there being a trespass, there is TCE in the ground water under the property, there is technically a trespass, but exactly how does that interfere with the use of anybody's property in this neighborhood? It really doesn't unless you are going to use the ground water, and nobody there is going to use the ground water, and so Whirlpool is not taking a hard line here on what damages Plaintiffs might actually be able to prove as a result of having this TCE that's being remediated in their ground water. What we are instead trying to do here is to resolve this litigation without going through all of the uncertainty that is associated with it, without incurring the tremendous expenses of experts that both sides will have to invest in and without digging into what the homeowners will net from any recovery that they get by generating higher attorneys' fees, and I don't want to go back there again, but it is an important aspect of why this early settlement is so favorable, Your Honor.

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Let's talk about the notice plan before I get into the details of the settlement. This is at, you know, the preliminary approval stage, and many courts are very focused on the adequacy of the notice. We welcome Your Honor's input on the notice, and we will be glad to work to modify it to make sure it suits the Court's needs. As I think you have observed,

you have to balance the need to have enough detail in there so that people do understand how their rights are affected with not wanting to overwhelm the residents with so much information that they throw the document into the trash can. What we are happy about here is that the class is small enough and manageable enough, we have everybody's name and address. We can easily provide direct mail notice to every resident of the class with certified mail. We also, as the Court is aware, plan to publish the notice for four consecutive weeks in the Southwest Times Record. We have an online copy of the amended class settlement agreement that will be posted and we have a claims administrator who will be available to respond to class members' questions about the process, and as Mr. Shemin has indicated, he would be willing to respond to questions in the class about what -- how people's rights may be affected, and obviously many of the residents also have Mr. Ledbetter who they can communicate with. Now, we've -- the Court's been through the classification definition, and I'm not going to belabor that. I would rather just get to the two subclasses. And I think we are getting a little ahead of ourselves here, The subclasses. The well -- the next one. Forward. Bill. Okay. The well ban subclass, I think the Court's very clear at this point that those are the residents that are within the confines of that rectangular area that I've pointed out to the map in there previously. These are people who have also

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experienced a reduction in the tax-assessed value of their properties and located within that area. Then the next class, of course, is the fringe subclass which those class members for both are identified specifically in exhibits to the settlement agreement, so there is no ambiguity or confusion about who is actually in the class. And this map shows in red the well ban subclass in case we need to refer to it, and in green the fringe subclass. And Your Honor asked a question of Mr. Shemin. How did you decide where to draw lines here, and, and by the way, I want to be clear, this -- the plume depicted on here is not exact. That's just a -- that's just a demonstrative depiction that the plume is in that area. But we consulted with Enviro, which is the environmental consulting company that's carrying out the remediation in concert with ADEQ and on behalf of Whirlpool, and we talked to them about, you know, the reasonable possibility that the plume could move outside its existing boundaries. What other properties do we reasonably think could ever be affected? And that's how we, Whirlpool, came up with these properties to include in the fringe subclass. The plume is fairly stable. It's been there for a long time. It's been delineated for a long time, but it is ground water and ground water does move with seasonal adjustments, differences in rainwater and so forth in the season, so it does move, but we feel very comfortable based on that input that we do have a very large margin for error or for

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future movement of the plume in the future. Now, the settlement terms, as the Court is aware, on the next slide, it shows that Whirlpool would pay a hundred percent to the well ban residents of their tax assessor devaluations or a hundred percent of an independent appraiser's evaluation of the property. We have in the amended proposal directly in response to a concern that Mr. Ledbetter raised with us, we've had added an appeal. If any of the property owners is dissatisfied with the independent appraiser's determination of their devaluation, they get to appeal. Whirlpool has no right of appeal itself. Plus, we've added 33 percent on top just to alleviate any concerns that the tax assessor's numbers might be a little lower than actual fair market values, and also, as I said, to incentivize the more reluctant members of the class to be more enthusiastic. The property owners have simply had to agree to release their claims, property only, not health claims, allow reasonable access for testing --

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THE COURT: Let me ask you about it. They are not releasing personal injury claims obviously, and you've indicated to me that there's, at least as the Arkansas

Department of Environmental Quality said, there's not a health risk here. But if there were to become a health risk, what, what about -- does this also release -- let's say, for example -- I hope it doesn't happen, but let's say that there were some possible health claims that might occur in the future

because -- would it be releasing indemnity claims if -- you know, we've got a bunch of these properties that are apartments and rental properties, and if, if a landowner rents his home to someone and that person has a health claim that arises and then that landowner gets sued, will that landowner have to pay an indemnity claim against Whirlpool because I think, I think it gets released.

MR. BRUNSON: I think an indemnity claim or a loss based on health injury would be released under this.

THE COURT: It will. It was probably not intended, but I think the release language probably does release it, but that's just one claim I foresaw. Hopefully, there aren't going to be any healthcare claims, but I notice that healthcare claims are exempted with this, but I was wondering about an indemnity claim if someone, some landowner -- there have been a bunch of apartments out there, and I realize that's not likely to occur, but they are getting apparently -- I recently saw they are getting ready to do some soil vapor tests, and so hopefully those are negative, but, you know, the healthcare or health claims are -- while they are not likely, they are not impossible, because we just simply don't know.

MR. BRUNSON: That's correct. It's not impossible.

And, you know, honestly I haven't looked at the lease with an
eye towards whether that exact scenario would be covered, but I
can tell you with certainty that the intention is that it would

be covered.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRUNSON: So the next line, the fringe settlement terms, Whirlpool pays -- initially it was \$5,000. We increased that by 33 percent, so now Whirlpool is paying every resident of the fringe class \$6,650. And the future option would include, as you identified, that essentially if there is a detection of TCE in the ground water above fresh hold limits, then you basically get the same relief that the well ban class does, and property owners, they are simply being paid this money in order to agree to what that future option would be so that the community has certainty, Whirlpool has certainty, the residents have certainty as to what is going to happen in the future if, if that eventuality takes place. That seems to be in everybody's best interests so that we don't then have another round of expensive and time-consuming litigation. going to the criteria which Your Honor has already reviewed somewhat with Mr. Shemin, numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy. As to numerosity, I think it's pretty clear that as defined, the -- let's go to the next slide. I think that's --

THE COURT: Let me ask this question. You've got subclasses. Does the Rule 23(a) analysis have to be applied separately to each subclass?

MR. BRUNSON: It does.

THE COURT: That's what I thought.

MR. BRUNSON: But the subclasses together certainly or separately -- there are 53 in the well ban and 53 in the fringe. It wasn't planned that way, but it worked out, so you have a total of 106, but in either class, you have above that 40 number, and the Eighth Circuit indeed has approved some classes with as few as 20 members.

THE COURT: You know, I tell you, I know what case you are relying on and I read that case. What that case stands for is the proposition that particular circumstances can justify a lower class. What happened in this case, that was the case where some African-American school teachers has sued the State of Arkansas regarding their -- they weren't getting paid. They were discriminated in their pay. And that was a 1971 case, and what the Eighth Circuit did is they said that 17 was sufficient, and the reason they said it was is that the class members were not likely to file individual actions because they feared getting fired from their job. And then also that the State of Arkansas changed the law. So I don't think that that case stands for the proposition that 17 -- that as few as 17 class members is -- meets the numerosity standard.

MR. BRUNSON: But I do think it stands well for the proposition that the Court has discretion to consider the facts and circumstances of the class and that there is no bright line and --

THE COURT: Yeah, I don't think there is.

MR. BRUNSON: Similarly, I'm sorry --

THE COURT: No, no. I'm -- there is no bright line. You are absolutely right.

MR. BRUNSON: And I think the facts and circumstances in this case weigh heavily in favor of exercising the Court's discretion to approve this class with admittedly fairly small numbers for the reason that Mr. Shemin pointed out, and that the Court indicated was Mr. Shemin's best argument, and I agree, that there are people who absent a class resolution are going to get no resolution. They are not going to get any money. They are not getting -- we are not going to get an access agreement from them or a release. It's just nothing is going to happen.

THE COURT: Yeah, that goes to the issue of whether or not individual actions are better than a collective action, and, and, you know, I can certainly see where there can be some class members out there that are just -- one, they are frightened of litigation, and, and, two, they wonder what it's going to cost them. And, so, there's a lot of merit to that argument.

MR. BRUNSON: I think so. I agree. And on the next slide, if we could move to typicality, I think it's fairly clear that we have Day and Wilson each typical of the subclass that they --

THE COURT: Were you aware that Mr. Day did not own the property?

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MR. BRUNSON: I will be completely honest with you. I knew that because I had looked him up before in the spreadsheet and realized that I had to go to a different name.

THE COURT: I mean, this can be fixed.

MR. BRUNSON: It can be. It just didn't occur to me honestly to think that it was an LLC that owned property, and, therefore -- I don't even know if the LLC owned the property when the lawsuit was brought. That's something that we would need to look into, but obviously we were working very well with Mr. Shemin and that's an issue that could easily be resolved with the Court's indulgence.

THE COURT: What about Mrs. Wilson? When did she come into the picture?

MR. BRUNSON: Mrs. Wilson, as you know, was formally added in July immediately before the settlement agreement. It was a part of the extensive discussions that we had.

THE COURT: When did you become aware that Mrs. Wilson was involved, because she entered -- I mean, the complaint was amended the day before the settlement agreement. When did you -- did you negotiate the well ban settlement with Mr. Shemin before he had a client who was a well ban class member?

MR. BRUNSON: Honestly, I don't know exactly when

Mr. Shemin signed up Mrs. Wilson. I do know that --

THE COURT: I think he would have told you whether or not he had a client in the well ban class.

MR. BRUNSON: We had conversations about the fact that he needed to have a representative of the well ban class, and Mr. Shemin assured me that he had had conversations with a number of people who were residents of the well ban class and that would not pose any difficulties, and that he had met with the residents and talked to them about their concerns. Now, whether -- on what day he actually signed Mrs. Wilson up, I don't know that.

THE COURT: I'm sure there are some that didn't want to have their name on the complaint that he may have talked to, but, nevertheless, she did, but it's just the fact that she -- I mean, the optics of it, of her becoming a class plaintiff when he filed his lawsuit, I think in September of 2013, or maybe July of 2013, I can't remember when it was filed, and so, you know, the settlement agreement is reached and the day before the settlement agreement is amended and the amended complaint is exactly the same as the complaint except for, you know, adding a party.

MR. BRUNSON: If I could, on that issue, Your Honor, though, maybe I'm -- I want to hear what you're listening for here, and it seems to me that --

THE COURT: It has to do with advocacy of the class

representative. I mean, that's the issue.

MR. BRUNSON: Okay. But let's say Mrs. Wilson was brought in the day before it was amended and she lied. Just make that assumption. Provided that Mr. Shemin fully explained to Mrs. Wilson the circumstances of the lawsuit and the settlement process, and she agreed to it, I'm not sure why that would render her inadequate. I'm not sure there's a requirement that she would need to have been involved for some particular period of time.

THE COURT: I mean, it's the Plaintiff's claim. It's not Mr. Shemin's claim.

MR. BRUNSON: Yes; correct.

THE COURT: And the -- you know, and the extent that, you know, communications with her and how informed she was about this, about this settlement, but, you know, the appearance of it is that, you know, the settlement agreement was negotiated and made before she was even a party. Maybe, maybe she was a client back in December. He just didn't think to amend the complaint then. I don't know what the circumstances are, but when the complaint gets amended the day before the settlement agreement, it calls into question who negotiated the settlement agreement.

MR. BRUNSON: I understand that, and I think the real question there is the adequacy of Mr. Shemin's communication with Mrs. Wilson and the due diligence involved in her signing

off on the settlement, not necessarily the timing of it, although I understand there is a relationship between the two. But certainly we have not questioned her adequacy.

THE COURT: Yeah, but she's representing -- the well ban class is the most -- is the class most affected here, and she is the class representative for that well ban class, and so her involvement and the time of her involvement is important. She can, she can make a decision even if she did not know anything or didn't know that she was going to be a litigant or didn't talk to a lawyer until a week before. I mean, she can become a class plaintiff even though she made that decision a week before the settlement was made, but it calls into question about the -- about the negotiations about the settlement and, I mean, she is the one that had to make the decision, not Mr. Shemin.

MR. BRUNSON: Correct. Well, Your Honor, I think when you consider the adequacy of the class representatives, you really have to look at the results of what they achieved.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BRUNSON: And this is an extremely generous settlement for these residents, so I think those results really speak volumes as to the adequacy issue. Going to the next slide, commonality, you know, I think it's pretty clear, as I mentioned earlier, there's a common source of contamination and common liability issues, although the causes of action are a

little different. We have the tax assessor's devaluations which are common. Factual issues would be the same, if this were pursued. Common questions of law. It seems pretty clear to me that we have commonality. We've already talked about adequacy. And, of course, you mentioned Rule 23(b) which is the predominance of requiring of the class action. It seems again pretty clear that while there are individuals, individual issues in this class action as there are in virtually all class actions, we do here have the common source of contamination. Everybody lives in the same neighborhood. They all have the same tax assessor who has issued these devaluation opinions. They have common forms of injury and damages. Those predominate over the --

THE COURT: Let me, let me ask that question about it because I was going to ask Mr. Shemin this question, and that is -- has to do with the landowner who signs that access agreement and ends up with remediation taking place on their property. Is that landowner not different than the landowner down the street who has not been impacted by any type of remediation? I can tell for you sure if, you know, if I had water wells and vapor collection equipment in my backyard, I would sure think differently that I had been -- I've been damaged differently than my neighbor down the street who hasn't had any impact at all.

MR. BRUNSON: I understand your concern, Your Honor,

and if I could, two things. First, the ground water monitoring wells are -- it's not like an oil rig in somebody's backyard. It's a very small thing. It's like if you take this water pitcher, it's about the size of the top of the water pitcher, and it's about that high up out of the ground on a very small space. It's not something that you would have to dig up a swimming pool to put in. And, secondly, the access agreement that we have here provides a lot of rights to the homeowners. It indicates that Whirlpool has to conduct all activities in a safe, efficient, workmanlike, and non-negative manner, has to comply with all the laws and regulations. Whirlpool agrees to conduct its activities so as to minimize disruption of business or landowner activities located at the property and, where possible, to avoid disruption entirely. Those are -- those give the landowners rights, and it seems to me that if you had a landowner who felt like Whirlpool was asking too much, if they wanted to put, put a well where a swimming pool was, which I don't think they would, but if something like that happened, certainly the landowner has rights that they could deny that access and they could --

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THE COURT: This, this doesn't give the landowner the right to deny access to the property. I mean, when I read it, it doesn't. Of course, you know, I've read it once or twice and that's about it and I may be, I may be wrong, but this access agreement gives -- of course, Whirlpool is going to do

what ADEQ tells them to do, isn't that right? Are they going -- who's going to tell Whirlpool where to put these monitoring wells?

MR. BRUNSON: Well, ADEQ doesn't, doesn't get down to the level of granularity to say exactly where on this property in general speaking the well needs to go, but ADEQ does have requirements that Whirlpool has to have, you know, certain numbers of wells in appropriate locations and so forth. And Whirlpool is obligated, to the extent that it can, to comply with ADEQ's directives, but, of course, we have the situation now where Whirlpool and ADEQ are having discussions because ADEQ wants a certain number of vapor monitoring points and Whirlpool is not able to get access to the exact properties that it needs in order to install those, and so there's an ongoing conversation there about what do you do when Whirlpool wants to comply, wants --

THE COURT: Listen. I firmly believe Whirlpool is operating in good faith in trying to resolve this problem. It's got some real impediments to try to do it and this is a vehicle to try to maybe solve some of those, but they -- it's tough on Whirlpool. I don't doubt. They have got ADEQ telling them you need monitoring wells and you need other soil vapor tests and you don't have the ability to do anything about it and you want to do something about it.

MR. BRUNSON: Exactly right. That's exactly right.

And so the point I'm making there is your question was can ADEQ make you do this, and the answer is, well, yeah, but not if we don't have access, but if we do have access, which hopefully we would, if the Court were to approve this agreement and people were to not opt out --

again apologize in interrupting you, but what authority does the Court have to impose a perpetual easement? I mean, an easement is the dominant estate and the rest of the property is the subservient estate, and the dominant estate can do what they want to do with the property, and that's just basic property law we learned in the first year of law school. And the reason I have experience with it is representing oil and gas companies and you know what they can do with the property, and so my question is does Whirlpool know how many monitoring wells need to be drilled out here on these well ban class that ADEQ is requesting to be drilled?

MR. BRUNSON: I'm sorry. The last part of your question --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I don't think --

MR. BRUNSON: I was following you --

THE COURT: -- that was a poor question the way I asked it. Does Whirlpool know today how many monitoring wells that ADEQ wants drilled on the well ban class properties?

MR. BRUNSON: My understanding is that Whirlpool has

had access that it needs for the ground water monitoring wells that ADEQ requires. That's not an immediate issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BRUNSON: The immediate issue is vapor monitoring.

THE COURT: Okay. And explain to me what's required of that. What -- what -- how many, where, and what's the equipment or whatever is out on the property?

MR. BRUNSON: For vapor monitoring?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BRUNSON: So the vapor monitoring well is -- it's It's called a vapor point. And it's soil gas not a well. testing is what is envisioned in the current RADD, and in the RADD, Whirlpool is required to have five of these established. Whirlpool has put some into place, but unfortunately they didn't work out well because there was ground water there and, you know, you have to take into consideration whether there are utilities in the ground and so forth. So there's a very limited scope of properties that actually meet the qualifications for installation of a vapor point. And so Whirlpool has a need for two more properties that are located basically on the plume, because the concept of vapor soil gas testing as to take a sample, we drill down into the soil, you take a sample of the gases that are above the ground water and see to the extent to which there is your vapor escaping from the ground water, if there is at all. Now, there's another

type of vapor testing that you actually do --

THE COURT: Okay. You've told me enough. I'm just -what I'm trying to understand is that, you know, the notice
tells these class members that they are given access for
investigation for remediation. And one of my concerns is, I
mean, the notice is already ten pages long, but, I mean, if I
got that notice and I had somebody knock on my door and tell me
we are going to go put a vapor monitoring -- I don't know that
notice told me that that was likely to happen. And so I'm a
little concerned about -- you know, this access agreement is
that, you know, what type of notice would be adequate to inform
a landowner on that, that easement that they are going to be
giving Whirlpool for perpetuity, what's likely to happen? What
may happen to my property? Because that's going to affect
their decision whether, one, to opt out, and, you know, what
they want to do.

MR. BRUNSON: Well, I understand and appreciate your concern, and to ameliorate it hopefully somewhat with respect to vapor monitoring, we are only talking about two more properties, and the soil gas testing vapor point is similar to the ground water testing apparatus, it's unobtrusive, and can be placed hopefully in an area of the property that won't unduly inconvenience the homeowner. Now, frankly, my discussions with Mr. Ledbetter and his clients about access for vapor testing have actually gone the other way. His clients

want more, not less. Apparently they want Whirlpool to come and drill a hole under the house and test indoor air quality in some instances of the residents' homes to see if there is vapor in that area, and that's really more in the context of the most recent discussions that we have had in an effort to get access to do the testing, and, unfortunately, we haven't been able to reach those agreements.

THE COURT: Well, do, do -- I mean, a lot of these people who are going to be named class members are not going to respond, they are not going to file a claim, they are going to do nothing, yet under this, under this settlement agreement, you have a provision where the Court appoints an attorney-infact to convey this easement to Whirlpool. And, again, let's say, a landowner gets a knock on the door and they say we are here, you know, to put in this vapor monitoring equipment or to put a monitoring well on their property, have they gotten adequate notice that that's likely to happen? Because to me, and I know Mr. Ledbetter has spent a lot of time on this, but if it's fair and it's reasonable, that's fine, but I think that the landowner is going to have to have adequate notice that, you know, what could possibly happen to their property with that access agreement.

MR. BRUNSON: I totally agree. And, you know, we feel like that the draft class notice is adequate, but we don't have any concerns about having further discussions with the Court.

If you have a particular concern about that aspect of it, we can certainly make that more clear. I did review it with an eye toward that. It seemed, you know, given the obvious, which you have noted, and that is that a lot of people will get this in the mail that they are just not going to read it. There's not much you can do about that, but to the extent that somebody does read this notice, our sense is that it does, it does adequately apprise them of their rights, and, Your Honor, it's not --

THE COURT: Landowners do have a duty to -- I mean, they do have a duty. I mean, they can't -- to read something, and, you know, they just can't sit back. And I've got that in another class action case where, you know, the class members, you know, didn't do anything, but, you know, they have -- they do have some duty, particularly if they have a claim, they have a duty to read it and maybe consult with a lawyer about it, so they are not totally -- a landowner is not totally blameless here. But they need to be given some type of notice because the wording "investigation remediation" is so wide open, I mean, I don't know that they have been told what could likely happen to their property.

MR. BRUNSON: Well, again, it's not like they are not being told about some big fact they need to know, like we are going drill an oil well in their backyard. These are, as I said, unobtrusive and an agreement that is very resident

oriented I think. You are protective of their rights. important point, Your Honor, is we are primarily talking about the well ban class at this point. And those people are getting tens of thousands of dollars, huge percentages, whether it's 50 or 75 percent of their property values. They are probably more likely than most recipients of the class action notice to become aware of what their rights are. There's going to be chatter in the neighborhood. I would be surprised if very many, if any, of the residents of the well ban did not act either by opting out or by accepting their payment. And, of course, that's part of the reason why we are paying as much money as we are to resolve this case. Next slide. I'd like to walk through three different scenarios because Mr. Ledbetter is going to speak after me and he has concerns that he expressed and the Court's allowed him to about the settlement negotiation, but I think a fundamental question here is what is in the best interests of the people who live in this neighborhood? Under what scenario do they stand to come out farthest ahead in this situation, and so I've taken one sample property. I picked it at random. It's in the Westphal property, 1400 Brazil Avenue. It's a well ban property at the corner of Brazil and Ferguson, and the old tax assessment value as you see on this lot was \$51,100, and that means -- when I say, "old value," I mean the tax assessor appraised that property for purposes of assessing taxes at \$51,100.

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value, taking contamination into consideration, is \$22,050. The devaluation, therefore, subtracting, gets you \$29,050. When you add 33 percent to that, that's \$9,587, meaning the total compensation for this property owner, if he chooses to accept the tax assessor's number, is \$38,637. The percentage of the original value of that settlement is 75.7 percent of that property. Now, the guy gets to keep his property. All he's giving up is access for monitoring wells, deed restriction that doesn't allow him to drill a well, which nobody is going to drill a well anyway, and a release of his property value claims. Now, let's look at a second scenario of this same property owner. I call this the litigation damages scenario, and it assumes that the class is not certified, that Mr. Ledbetter proceeds with this individual's claim against Whirlpool and that he adds -- he says, okay, the tax assessor number is too low. I want to add 13-and-a-half percent to that number and that gets you to \$58,000. And let's assume that Mr. Ledbetter at trial is able to convince a jury that it should pay 20 percent of that property value, because that's what the data really shows. The EPA study is under ten percent. Some of the other studies by Mr. Simons, using different methodologies, pushed the number up to 20 percent and higher, but 20 percent is the number sort of in the middle range of what a plaintiff in a case like this is likely to recover. And so let's give them that 20 percent. That's

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\$11,600 after trial. And if you take out fees of about 33 percent, that's \$3,028, and at that point you will have also incurred a lot of costs, probably \$10,000 per property owner, because that would get you in the range of three to \$400,000 in costs, and it's clearly going to cost that much to bring in the various experts who will be needed to try this case. So what is the net to that owner of the payment [sic]? The owner there is going to get less than zero. In other words, after he pays his fees and costs, there is zero recovery for that property owner, if he goes forward and tries his case against Whirlpool and wins. Now, let's look at a third scenario. I call it the home run damages scenario. This is Mr. Ledbetter's best day in court where, with respect to the same property, he has the \$58,000 and instead of getting 20 percent, he gets 100 percent. The jury says it's so bad that you have TCE in the ground water under your house, even though you don't ever use the ground water, even though there's no way for it to get to your air that you breathe, still, you deserve to be paid a hundred percent of the value of your home. That's \$58,000, when you add the additional 13-and-a-half percent that Mr. Ledbetter wants added to the tax assessor's numbers. Well, take out his fee. That's 33 percent. That's \$19,000. Let's take out \$10,000 for costs. The net to that owner is \$28,800 of the home run jury verdict. The difference between what we are offering today, that person gets \$10,000 less than what we are

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offering. And how far down the road are we, a year, two years, with an appeal, maybe more. Time value of money is important to consider. What I'm suggesting, Your Honor, is this is a generous settlement, but not only is it generous in isolation. When you think of it in the context of what is the best alternative to what we are proposing to the Court, it seems inescapable that this is a great deal for the residents of this area. And Whirlpool is not oblivious to that. It realizes that it is overpaying this case. Why? Because it wants to avoid the cost of litigation. It wants to avoid uncertainty. It wants to move forward with this remediation in the best interests of the property owners. And Whirlpool feels a responsibility. It was a neighbor of these people for 45 years. And it feels a responsibility to see this thing through. And that's why we are here pursuing this. And, Your Honor, I appreciate your questions. You know, the relief that we are asking is preliminary approval of a class settlement. That isn't the final word, as Your Honor knows. There would still be a full fairness hearing in a few months after there is notice, which we would be happy to negotiate further with the Court, if you have any concerns that need to be addressed about it, but the key point is let's give these residents a chance to sit down at their kitchen table with the notice in front of them, talking to their family members, talking to their lawyers if they want to, talk to the class administrator if they want

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to, fully understanding what their rights are, what they are giving up, what they are going to be paid for that, and let them make that informed decision in hopes that we can avoid a longer battle that will in the end net less for the people who live in that neighborhood.

THE COURT: Can I ask a few questions?

MR. BRUNSON: Absolutely.

THE COURT: The provision about Whirlpool being able to draw from the settlement. Originally, I will tell you when I looked at the first settlement agreement, I didn't like it. That just essentially told me, you know, Whirlpool could walk away from this at any time they want to if they don't like it. That's what it said, you know, even up to the time it was at the United States Court of Appeals, the Eighth Circuit, the day before formal oral argument in the case, Whirlpool could say, I'm walking away from this deal. I mean, and now you've changed that and I don't see, you know, if more than 25 percent, you have the right to opt out, but that continues up until, you know, some point in time to the -- I guess maybe a final hearing. If, if Whirlpool thinks it is a fair and adequate settlement, you know, why is it reserving a right to walk away from the deal?

MR. BRUNSON: Well, if, if all of Mr. Ledbetter's clients, after full consideration, opt out and they don't want to proceed, I think we've got to take a look at where we are at

that point.

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THE COURT: I mean, I thought the purpose of this was to get the people who might be left behind. The people left behind will be left behind if Wal-mart, I mean, if Whirlpool just walks way.

MR. BRUNSON: Well, I'm certainly not saying that Whirlpool would, would terminate that --

THE COURT: But you are reserving the right to do that.

MR. BRUNSON: We do reserve that right. I don't think that's unreasonable, the 25 percent. I think -- the Court may have reservations at that point about whether to approve it. I think everybody's going to have to take look at where we are.

about this, because I want to hear what you have to say. I'm real concerned about the predominance of the individual claims as opposed to the claims of the class, and, again, I'm referring to the people who are going be impacted differently because of access agreement. Tell -- do you know -- help me understand how the common claims predominated over those.

MR. BRUNSON: Well, the common issues for -- if you could go back to the 26(b)(3) slide on 23. Sorry. Wrong number. But you still have the same common issues; that Whirlpool is the source; that there is TCE in the ground water; that they live in this neighborhood that is under remediation;

that they all have the same tax assessor's devaluations that have affected their property. Those are all common issues that we believe predominate over the individual issue of maybe you have one property owner who Whirlpool will never want to test anything on their property. They don't want a monitoring well. They don't want access. You know what? That resident is getting a windfall because Whirlpool is paying as if -- it's paying everybody the same amount, but it is paying the higher number in order to incentivize people to willingly allow that access to their property. So to the extent that there is a disparity in rights, it is accounted for by paying more to the people who are being imposed upon most and paying others the same amount, even if, as it turns out in the end, they are not imposed upon, and at this point, it's premature to say which residents may or may not, at this point which residents may or may not need to allow some testing on their property because, as I indicated, the plume, though stable, does fluctuate some with the seasons, and it's not possible for us to say right now that there's no property in the well ban you would never need access to. So everybody has, in a common sense, every owner in the well ban area is giving up an uncertain right that may happen in the future. And for some it will turn out to be a right that Whirlpool exercises and go on and put a little vapor point in the corner of their backyard, but for others nothing happens, but while certainly, while those are differences that

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may ultimately play out, they don't predominate. What predominates are those common issues that I pointed out to you earlier.

THE COURT: That's helpful.

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MR. BRUNSON: Any other questions?

THE COURT: Again, I know in your proposed order you write -- you cite to Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure about the Court's authority to transfer property, but is there, is there some other authority for the Court to do that? I mean, I don't --

MR. BRUNSON: There is, Your Honor. There are a number of cases that we cite to the Court, primarily in the context of cell phone tower property easements where the courts have encumbered properties, and I think the most on point for this is another case from the Eastern District of Arkansas, the McDaniel vs Sprint case, which this agreement was actually modeled upon. Where the Court approved that settlement agreement and where it similarly allowed -- it allowed an intermediary like we are having in terms of the claims administrator serve as the attorney-in-fact, same situation in that case, and it was upheld and approved. You know, in any class action settlement, you will have a bar order. Of course, that's one of the great advantages for a settling Defendant that will bar any claims that anybody has, and that bar order is going to bar everybody's claim whether they participate or

not. This is a little different because it's a real property issue, but a chosen action is a chosen action, and I'm not sure I see any difference. The last point I think is important and that is the due process issue. I think we need to make sure that, as Your Honor has indicated, that the notice is complete enough that people do understand what their rights are and because, you know, they need to have notice. They need to have an opportunity to opt out. They need to have an opportunity to be heard in order to make sure due process is honored.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. Thank you.

MR. BRUNSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: I tell you what I would like to do. I want to take about -- we've been at this for a couple of hours. Let's take about a ten-minute recess, and when we come back, I'll give Mr. Ledbetter an opportunity to speak.

(Off the record at this time.)

THE COURT: Please be seated. Mr. Ledbetter, before I go to you, I'd like to ask Mr. Brunson a couple of questions, if you'll step back up to the podium. I tell you what. You can do it from there. You've got your stuff. No, no, you stay right there, Mr. Brunson. I have a question about the claim form and the claim procedure. Does a class member have to file a claim to get paid?

MR. BRUNSON: Yes.

THE COURT: So if we have these people out here who

don't read the notice, who don't do anything, they don't file a claim, they are getting nothing, but they are having an access easement imposed on their property?

MR. BRUNSON: That's correct.

THE COURT: That's -- you know, the thing about it, your claims administrator is going to review this, and I think they probably have all of the information that they need right now to pay this claim.

MR. BRUNSON: You want us to pay the claim --

get a certified copy of the deed where you acquired the property. Okay. So they are going to have to go -- so they are going to get a certified copy of the deed, or if you inherited the property, tell us how you inherited the property, but if this is to protect the people who are left behind and they are the people that don't read these notices, they don't opt out, they are not -- in that claim form -- I don't know how many pages there are. And they are not going to get a copy of their deed, they get zero, and they haven't benefited from this.

MR. BRUNSON: Well, let's start with the point that we are paying these people a substantial amount of money to get their attention, to give them every incentive to return the claim form, so I don't think that there's a one-to-one relationship or anything close to that between the people who

may be left behind and the people who may not turn in a claims form. It's speculative, of course.

THE COURT: Why don't you just pay them if you know what you are going to -- if the difference between -- it's a difference in the assessment? Why don't you just cut them a check and send it to them, if you have -- and have them, you know, either indemnify you, if they are not the true owner of the property or something or that you are not giving money away to people?

MR. BRUNSON: We have no problem as long as the money gets to them, you know, we have no problem paying those claims. That's not -- the issue's not, well, we will try and save money.

THE COURT: I know it's not, but, you know, that may be a problem with the claims procedure is that you know what you're going to pay them. You can find out who owns the property. You know, we're talking about maybe 14 people, aren't we, in the well ban class, if all of his clients opt out?

MR. BRUNSON: Fourteen or nineteen, I think, your -THE COURT: Yeah, yeah, my numbers may be wrong, but
we will check that out, but --

MR. BRUNSON: But, again, Your Honor, at the preliminary approval stage, this would seem to me not an issue that would derail the settlement. This could be an issue that

afterwards -- because we will know when we get to the next hearing if there is anybody in that category, and if there is, again, we are happy to figure out a way to get the money to them. That's really not the issue for us. We want to complete --

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THE COURT: I didn't think it would be, but it's if they don't file the claim form, they get nothing.

MR. BRUNSON: I understand. I mean, it's -- I understand your concern.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Okay, Mr. Ledbetter.

MR. LEDBETTER: Thank you, Your Honor, and counsel. Ι guess just to kind of start out, all cases, of course, are different and unique and unusual, and this one is no exception. I've never been involved in a case where I felt like the defendant was working so hard to drive a wedge between my clients and I. I hear this over and over, both in the press releases they put out attacking what I'm doing as far as my representation, and the statements made, it's almost like I really don't represent the folks who have retained us to represent them in this case, and we do represent them, and we've represented them with the most professional and zealous way that I know how to represent a client, and that is to look out for their best interests. And so when Whirlpool came to us early on and pitched this deal, and I'm talking about way back before we filed suit or anything, and started talking about

some kind of global resolution, we wouldn't go along with it because we knew from the get-go that, number one, these cases are unique as most of these types of cases are. And they are not good candidates for class treatment. They are not good candidates under Arkansas law, which is, as you know, much more liberal in classification certification than the federal requirements for the Rule 23 commonality, typicality, and those types of things, but even under Arkansas law where you can have a trial on liability and split it off into individualized claims on damages and other non-common issues, my experience has been that these cases are hard to get certified, and there's a reason, and that is that these claims and these individual cases are unique. And we knew there weren't a whole lot of folks involved relative to most class actions we see. And we knew that individual circumstances, the duration that folks had been out there, the concentrations of contaminants under their property, all of these individualized issues would ultimately have a potential to come up if we could not reach settlement with them. So...

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THE COURT: Explain it to me a little about what these individualized issues are, because basically the primary claim, at least as to the well ban class, is a trespass.

MR. LEDBETTER: That's right.

THE COURT: And it's devalued their property as a result of that, and let's forget about punitive damages and

those type of claims. But what, what, what are the individualized issues for those individuals in the well ban class other than, say, a claim for punitive damages?

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MR. LEDBETTER: Okay. So for -- depending upon your location over the plume, and we have a plume map up here that is based on our expert's evaluation of the plume that we think is accurate. As you will see, the concentrations go from the center where they are highest out to the outer area where they decline as far as the amount of impact. So those who are closest to the plume that live over the most concentration may have issues with regard to vapor intrusion where there has been some exposure. People may have been there longer and had to deal with the issues of this investigation that have gone on for some period of time. So the amount of annoyance, interference, inconvenience which we contend under both the Felton Oil case that, as Mr. Shemin said, I mean, I wasn't only lead counsel, I was sole counsel on both the trial and the appeal of that case. And we think under restatements 929, a landowner is entitled to damages for inconvenience, annoyance, disruption, loss of peace of mind and those types of things, regardless of whether it's a temporary or permanent measure of damages. Some of these are landlords and not actual residents. So their degree of inconvenience and annoyance and that type of thing would vary. Strictly from a diminution point of view, I think that there is a possibility that those homes with higher,

those properties with higher contamination would have a higher diminution than those that are further out.

THE COURT: I don't understand that. This is a plume that is underground and it doesn't propose -- there's no health hazard here involved at all.

MR. LEDBETTER: Well, they are not asserting --

THE COURT: Now, that we know of now, and I just don't understand -- you know, the well ban class, of course, the plume doesn't follow along street lines.

MR. LEDBETTER: Correct.

THE COURT: You know, it's -- and this is, you know, the first, first couple of maps I've seen about where the plume is, but looks like they pretty well have a pretty large area of the well ban class there. I just don't understand how, if you're in the well ban class, I don't understand how you're more impacted. It just happens to be right beneath your house or, you know, down the street.

MR. LEDBETTER: I've tried these cases and juries come up with different results for different individuals. When we've done the bellwether approach that we are doing in this case.

THE COURT: But the measure of damages, you know, we have no person. The measure of damages is going to be the difference in fair market value before and after the trespass.

MR. LEDBETTER: If you use the permanent measure,

that's right. If you use cost of cleanup, it's going to cost more to clean up a highly contaminated property than one that has very low concentrations. And in the Felton Oil case --

about -- you-all know more about this litigation than I do about whether it was temporary or permanent, but it looks like to me that, you know, the permanent damage can be any -- you get the fair market value of the house. I guess it could be worth nothing. You know, there's a finite amount as to what the, what the permanent damages are. If a house is worth \$50,000 and now it's worth zero, the damages are \$50,000. And that would include use of enjoyment and any other claims.

MR. LEDBETTER: I think that it would not necessarily include the inconvenience, the disruption, and the annoyance that you endured during the period of time that you were --

THE COURT: What is an inconvenience that they are experiencing out there?

MR. LEDBETTER: Well, so Mr. Brunson talked about the drilling or these monitoring wells as being unobtrusive. They are a drill rig that sets up on a person's property for some period of time. And then you have people coming out there doing activities on your property.

THE COURT: Yeah, but that -- it doesn't take long to drill a water well 25 feet or eight feet or whatever, it just doesn't.

MR. LEDBETTER: It takes a few days.

THE COURT: You know, take a few days. It would be somewhat an inconvenience but somewhat of a minor inconvenience.

MR. LEDBETTER: Yes, sir. In Felton Oil the jury valued at \$25,000.

THE COURT: They were pretty generous, but, anyway...

MR. LEDBETTER: The test -- I'm sorry. The testimony of our clients, of course, there's not been any depositions taken, but in my experience, the testimony of what they have been through with this is not that much different than other cases I have handled where there was a fairly, as you described it, generous award of damages for what they have experienced.

THE COURT: Okay. So we've got investigations, inconvenience from drilling wells, what other are some of the other individualized issues?

MR. LEDBETTER: Well, so the folks that live out there who have found out recently in January of 2013 that they were living on top of a plume of TCE that is anywhere from,

Mr. Brunson said eight feet, I think you could say the ground water sometimes is more shallow, a few feet below the ground surface, have concerns about how has impacted their lives. It may not be a rational concern. There is still an open question about vapor intrusion. He mentioned this issue of vapor monitoring, and our disagreement, our disagreement boils down

to, and he said something that's just flat wrong, and I don't know if he didn't listen to his story about hearing what you want to hear. We've never asked them to do indoor air monitoring. I understand the difference between indoor air monitoring, subslab vapor monitoring and vapor wells or vapor points that they are, they are proposing.

THE COURT: You know, I really don't want to get into the --

MR. LEDBETTER: Sure.

THE COURT: -- what you-all tried to negotiate and whatever. That's your own business. What I'm trying to understand is that -- and you bring up vapor monitoring. You know, what is that, and how does that impact the property?

MR. LEDBETTER: The possibility of vapor intrusion, in other words, that these residents have been exposed to TCE vapors is an open question. And it's something that ADEQ has been trying to get Whirlpool to do for a long time.

THE COURT: But they haven't been able to do it because they can't get access to the property.

MR. LEDBETTER: No, that's not true.

THE COURT: I'm just saying. I don't know. I haven't read the --

MR. LEDBETTER: And you don't want to get into our negotiations, but it's not because they can't get access. It's because the way they want to do it is, in our expert's opinion,

a method that is designed to validate their conclusions they have already reached that vapor exposure, vapor intrusion is not an issue. We don't agree with that. ADEQ doesn't agree with that. But there is an ongoing dispute. We attached the letter --

THE COURT: Yeah, I saw that.

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MR. LEDBETTER: -- recently --

THE COURT: What's ADEQ ordering them to do now?

MR. LEDBETTER: They are ordering them to do subslab vapor monitoring, which is what we have asked for all along, not indoor air monitoring. They say that the vapor points that Whirlpool has proposed are an ineffective means of determining vapor intrusion and they have told them to do subslab, and we have told both Whirlpool and ADEQ that our clients, some of them are here, will give access if they will do the subslab vapor monitoring, and that will, that will determine whether or not there has been in some of these homes, again, that are closest to the center of the plume, whether vapor intrusion has been an issue, whether they have actually been exposed to unacceptably high concentrations of TCE vapors, and the evidence on TCE continues to evolve, but it is more harmful. It is now known to be more harmful than we thought four or five years ago, and so this is a real issue that we think needs to be developed, and that's -- we are doing discovery. We have expert witnesses that we've retained --

THE COURT: Well, what about the fact that claims for personal injury or health claims are excluded from the agreement? If either your clients became a member of the class and decided to stay in and it turned out that there's some health risk as a result of vapor, they wouldn't be precluded

MR. LEDBETTER: If, if -- I mean, in your scenario, and we've talked about this all along, that they don't seek a release of health claims, that is correct, that those claims would exist. But we are talking about -- the problem with a health claim in my view is that when you have exposure to a toxic chemical, you have a long latency period.

THE COURT: You have a what?

from suing Whirlpool, would they?

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MR. LEDBETTER: A latency period between exposure and onset of disease, and so in the meantime, if you have had a significant exposure, you have additional rights and remedies such as the possibility we could amend if we find that there is an unacceptable amount of vapor exposure, medical monitoring, and other remedies that currently aren't available because the data is not there, and the reason the data is not there is that Whirlpool has resisted doing what needs to be done to determine is there an unacceptable risk.

THE COURT: Well, if the vapor monitoring is all about determining whether there are healthcare claims and those are exempted from the agreement, and those individuals, even if

they stay in the class, can sue Whirlpool, I mean, what's the problem with it?

MR. LEDBETTER: Because I believe that the release, the exemption from actual personal injury claims again is onset of disease, and there is -- there are remedies available between exposure and disease onset, if you can show significant exposure.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Let's move on from vapor monitoring to something else.

MR. LEDBETTER: All right. Let's do that. I agree. So let me talk about some of things that we think are a problem with this and you have, you have highlighted most of them because, you know, we, we --

THE COURT: I tell you, one thing I'm real interested in hearing from you about is the Rule 23(a) requirements for class certification. You know, if your clients are going to opt out, why do you care if the case is certified or not, if they are going to pursue their own litigation?

MR. LEDBETTER: And if, if all of our clients decide to opt out at this point, we believe we have met with our clients as soon as this was announced, we've gone over it with them. Of course, it changed from the original proposal to the current proposal which was changed based on discussions that I had with counsel about some of the problems that we saw with this proposal. And instead of addressing all of our problems,

they addressed a handful of them, I think, again, to try to sort of get the minimum amount of what they thought would drag our clients into this. Whether or not every single client that we represent will opt out, we haven't made that statement at this point because they have got a decision to make, if you decide to grant preliminary approval, and I agree with you, if all of them opt out, then whatever happens with this, they still have their individual claims and will continue down that, down that road. And then I go back to the point that you just made with Mr. Brunson, which is exactly right, is that this, this agreement as proposed would impose a deed restriction that is beyond anything I've ever seen, and I've negotiated as many deed restrictions I think as any lawyer in Arkansas. It is in perpetuity, and that is just not the way that I've ever seen them done. It should be, as you noted, the remedial action decision document -- in all of these cleanups, the goal is to actually do remediation, and if you don't do remediation, then that triggers what happened in Felton Oil, which is you can recover cost of cleanup. What we believe Whirlpool is trying to do is, through this perpetual deed restriction, is to be allowed to not meet the cleanup goals that have been set in the RADD.

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THE COURT: Okay. Help me understand that a little more.

MR. LEDBETTER: Okay. The deed restrictions that I'm

familiar with, and the ones that ADEQ -- that I've seen, they even proposed in the limited situations where they have actually been involved, because usually it's negotiated between the company that's responsible for the impact and the landowner, would have a provision in there that the deed restriction can be removed once the cleanup goals are met and there's no additional threat.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. LEDBETTER: This one is in perpetuity.

THE COURT: Well, the deed restriction is in perpetuity, but what about access?

MR. LEDBETTER: The access agreement is for a period of time. Twenty years, I think.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LEDBETTER: Twenty something years. And the reason is, in my experience in doing these, and representing both sides of the table in these cases, is at some point you have done all of your post-remedy monitoring, whether or not you end up meeting your cleanup goals, which are the current cleanup goals, or you can later because you have some basis such as a perpetual deed restriction, negotiate for less stringent cleanup goals, but at some point you are going to close those monitoring wells. Whirlpool is going to walk away from this. So the need for access is not permanent, but the need for restrictions to the property --

THE COURT: Well, the main restriction is they can't drill water wells. Isn't that the main restriction?

MR. LEDBETTER: Uh-huh; right.

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THE COURT: Who's going to drill a water well in their backyard over on Ingersoll?

MR. LEDBETTER: I have no crystal ball to tell you what's going --

THE COURT: I tell you what we know from property law, that's property is just a bundle of rights, and that's a bundle of right, the right to drill a water well. But the likelihood of somebody drilling a water well is so remote that --

MR. LEDBETTER: Well, it is one of your property rights, and you have a right to drill a property well at eight feet to 25 feet if that's the lens of saturated ground water. The deed restrictions that we do, prevent access to contaminated ground water, because there's deeper ground water. And this is a blanket drilling restriction without regard to whether or not you're drilling in contaminated ground water or not. But, Your Honor, all of this highlights what's going on here, and what's going go on here is Whirlpool is dictating all of these terms without sophisticated counsel on the other side representing these property owners and saying, wait a second, we need this access agreement to say such and such. We need this deed restriction to say such and such and these are reasonable terms.

THE COURT: Well, I know that's your view, but, again, why do you care if all of your clients opt out?

MR. LEDBETTER: If all of our clients opt out, I agree with you. It's some -- it becomes -- the people that they are saying they're not going to leave behind, who could be left behind in all of this by having terms that you've approved, that we view to be unfair, unreasonable, overly broad, and that type of thing.

THE COURT: Okay. Is the lack of Whirlpool's access to the well ban area, is that an impediment to what ADEQ is asking them to do now?

MR. LEDBETTER: Not as far as I'm concerned because we have offered access if they will do what ADEQ is asking them to do. And if we opt out, we are not going to give them access unless they do what ADEQ has asked them to do, as opposed to doing something that we view and ADEQ views as an ineffective means of determining the possibility of vapor intrusion.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. Go ahead.

MR. LEDBETTER: The suggestion I think that counsel has not been engaged in litigation and discovery, we have. And we have spent since January '13, when we got involved in this case, significant time and significant money in developing these cases. I can't speak for Mr. Shemin as to what he has expended, but certainly we have done that. And I think that, you know, that is one of the issues that Whirlpool keeps trying

to say that this is an early settlement and so on and so forth. 1 2 From our standpoint, we are getting our cases ready. 3 address some of the things about, you know, the -- I don't know if you care about the best case/worst case scenario. 4 5 Obviously, we disagree with that. In the Felton Oil case, the woman's property was worth \$30,000. The last offer at trial 6 7 was \$50,000. The jury verdict was \$205,000. I have settled as 8 many ground water cases, I really believe, as any lawyer in 9 Arkansas, and probably tried as many, and we have had 10 diminutions ranging from or we've had total settlements that 11 were more than the total value of the property. But we've had 12 just diminution settlements approaching 92 percent, depending 13 upon the circumstances. And, again, different properties have 14 resulted in different awards or settlements depending upon how 15 impacted they were and upon what was going on there. So I 16 realize that Mr. Brunson is experienced and that -- but to 17 stand up here and tell you the best and worst case for us, is 18 just, I think, is not necessarily accurate. And I think he's 19 doing that for purposes for the benefit of our clients who are 20 here today to try to concern them as to what they can do. realize that litigation is risky. And that there's always the 21 22 risk of getting less at trial than you were offered in 23 settlement. We all know that. But to sit here and say as an 24 absolute that that's the case, is just something that we 25 disagree with. So I guess, you know, we have -- I was going to

talk to you about the way that all of this came about as far as our negotiations with Whirlpool, but you don't want to hear that. We weren't privy to what was going on between Mr. Shemin and Whirlpool counsel as far as this proposed settlement.

Suffice it to say, after the settlement was announced, we were approached about what can we do to bring you into this settlement? We met with our clients. We went back. We made proposals. We haven't been able at this point to reach a satisfactory, what we think is satisfactory for the people we represent, so that's what has us here today.

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THE COURT: Okay. You know, the purpose of this class action is to, according to Whirlpool's motion, they think they are giving fair compensation to these landowners, but it also gives them some finality and certainty. Isn't there a public interest in getting this contamination cleaned up and bringing some finality and certainty to what's going to occur with the problem out at Whirlpool?

MR. LEDBETTER: Yes. Yes, it is. There is. And so that concerns me about why do they want a perpetual deed restriction if they are really going to clean up to the standards that are set up in the RADD, so are we getting that finality and certainty?

THE COURT: That RADD is so far above my ability to understand, that somebody's going to have to explain it to me, if it ever becomes an issue in this case, because I attempted

to go through and try to understand that. While you mentioned that, I will ask you this. It looks like to me that there is something planned that's going on for two years, and the end of two years is it going to be re-evaluated --

MR. LEDBETTER: Correct.

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THE COURT: -- and then make a determination about are there other steps to take?

MR. LEDBETTER: That's the way it is currently written, but it can be changed, and with a perpetual deed restriction, we think the next thing that Whirlpool will ask to do is to revise the RADD to say that what we've done, which is the chemical treatment that they are doing, they are going to do some additional source reduction, which our expert told us early on that they hadn't characterized the full extent of the source area. There's probably a phase-separated component of this, a Dean Apple [phonetic], a dense-not-adequate-spaceliquid, component to the source area that's not adequately being addressed, but they attacked the source area and then they determined if that results in what's called natural attenuation out away from the source area of the plume, whether or not those concentrations are naturally declining mainly due to dilution but some chemical processes that cause these chemicals that are organic chemicals to break down, and if there is not, the way the RADD is currently written, if natural attenuation, the remedy of just monitoring outside of the

source area does not prove to be effective, then Whirlpool will be required to come in and expend additional sums for active remediation. But what you see over and over in these cases, if you handle these cases, is that natural attenuation is not effective. I'm working on a case now that they have been trying to naturally attenuate it since 1991, and the TCE levels are the same or higher, and so the question is can we somehow get ADEQ to allow us to walk away from this by getting institutional control such as a perpetual deed restriction to allow us to leave it there? So the idea that it is going to be cleaned up under this scenario I think is not necessarily one that we can take to the bank.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEDBETTER: I want to mention one thing about the how the proposal got changed from paying the assessor's diminution plus attorneys' fees.

THE COURT: I still, I still don't understand why you care about that, if you don't -- if your clients are going to opt out.

MR. LEDBETTER: And I can't tell you today that they are all going to opt out, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, this is the proposal I have in front of me.

MR. LEDBETTER: Yeah. And that's, and that's why I'm going to talk to you --

THE COURT: And I either accept it or reject it.

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MR. LEDBETTER: And that's why I want to talk to you about the proposal and why we think it's not fair because the assessor's appraisal of the pre-contamination, as you know, they vary from property to property because they are just done en masse. They don't necessarily catch all of the improvements or the true condition of the properties like a true appraisal would of those properties, so if you are lucky enough to have a high appraisal for property assessment purposes, you get a larger amount. If your appraisal for tax assessment purposes was lower, you get a lower payment. But then they talk about this option, this appraisal option that you can elect to have an independent appraisal, and that, in my view, is the worst idea in the world. And so it starts out with they, they, they kept trying to suggest that it starts out with there being an appraisal that is done before that would show the value of it without regard to the tax assessment but just the value that it was pre-contamination. But that's not what their document says. Their document says that the independent appraisal -appraiser will use the pre-contamination tax assessment value and then make a determination with some unknown methodology as to what the diminution has been, and they don't spell out the methodologies.

THE COURT: You know, you know, when I looked at that, and I saw that issue when I looked at it, and because -- and

they are going to correct it, but they call it the assessed value rather than the appraised value. If you took the assessed value and you took the value of the property after the contamination, that might be more than what the assessed value is because the assessed valued is only 20 percent of the appraised value.

MR. LEDBETTER: If they truly used that, but I think --

THE COURT: I don't think they have intended to do that, but why -- so your -- you think the problem with that is the fact that somebody doesn't go get a true market value analysis as opposed to using the tax assessor's appraisal.

MR. LEDBETTER: Because we have had appraisals done that looked at the market before January 2013. And they were, as a rule, Mr. Brunson alluded to this, but he didn't tell you the source of it, 12 to 13 percent higher than the assessment, but that's an average. Within those appraisals, there were some that the tax assessments, as I mentioned, the appraised value for tax assessment purposes was much lower than what the percentage was. A few of the assessments for tax purposes, the appraisals for tax purposes were close to what the appraisers came up with, but we think fairness mandates that you have to look at the true fair market value before this became known and not what the tax assessor —

THE COURT: Does that mean some appraiser is just

going to have to go out and get a bunch of comparables before --

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MR. LEDBETTER: We've had a number of pre-January '13 appraisals done already. We shared them with Whirlpool. We did that in our initial disclosures. We shared those appraisals that had been done before that. And on the adding the one-third, the basis for that, they are bound by a confidentiality agreement, but I'm not. The two landowners that they settled with weren't represented by counsel, and so they agreed to pay them their tax assessed reduction, the reduction that the tax assessor did, plus an additional 33 percent. And so since those folks weren't represented by counsel, they promptly went and told all of their neighbors who are represented by counsel, we got a better deal than you because we chose not to go with the lawyers and we got to keep the extra third that Whirlpool has now tacked onto this because they knew that we were going to to make that an issue, because one of the hallmarks of fairness is all people within the same class or subclass get treated equally. So the two that -- and we've also been told that because of our negotiations, I think Mr. Brunson even made reference to this, you know, they are making this what they describe as a generous offer because of the efforts that we've made. So that's where the one-third came from was to combat that we would bring to your attention -- but obviously it's still a situation where if, if

our clients -- I guess if we only represented one and everyone else kept their powder dry, then they would have been allowed to negotiate separately with Whirlpool like Miss Keith and Miss Scroggin did and avoid Mr. Shemin taking any part of their recovery or McMath Woods or Taylor Law Partners, but that's where the extra third came from is we brought that to their attention, that it came to our attention that they had settled separate from this with two well ban landowners for the amount of their diminution plus an additional one-third.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEDBETTER: So that's the source, the source of that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEDBETTER: Your Honor, we think these cases should be and can be negotiated separately to a fair resolution. But we think that it should be informed by discovery and by true understanding of the worth of these claims and the rights of these landowners out here, and that's really why we are here. We think it ought to be fair and we don't think that it's fair. I understand it's a great deal for Whirlpool, because they get to pay what's a relatively small sum of money and get their deed restriction that they know they have got to have if they are going to walk away from really having to clean this mess up and to get an access agreement that they dictate as positioned to one that I've proposed that

really protects our landowners from the kind of disruption --

know, they love to use the term generous, but, you know, what they are -- as I understand, what they are willing to pay under the -- whether it's the assessment option or whether it's the market value option, there are some figures you can come up with here, but you are telling me that you believe that this claim is worth far more than what the fair market value of their property is, based on all of these elements of damages that you have. You just told me that you've settled cases that had fair market value of \$30,000, settled it for \$50,000, so that whoever it was that got the \$50,000 and kept their property.

MR. LEDBETTER: The Felton Oil case --

THE COURT: Sounds like you've had -- sounds like to me you kind of have an inflated value of your claim.

MR. LEDBETTER: Felton Oil didn't settle for \$50,000. We got a jury verdict of \$205,000 on a piece of property that was worth \$30,000 because of contamination. I have settled cases where the total settlement reflected more than a hundred percent diminution in these kind of ground water contamination cases because there are other elements of damages and there are other risks, not the least of which is the risk of punitive damages in this case.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

1 MR. LEDBETTER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ledbetter. Okay. I've heard from all the parties. Actually, Mr. Shemin has the burden of proof, and if you want an opportunity to make any further statement, I'll give you that opportunity.

MR. SHEMIN: No. Thank you.

THE COURT: I think I've heard it all.

MR. SHEMIN: Yeah, I think you have, too.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me tell you what I'm going to do. There's -- I've heard a lot here today, and I appreciate the efforts of all the lawyers, and what I will do is review this and get an order out. I will tell you, though, it will take us -- I'll try to get it as quickly as I can, but we are somewhat overloaded right now. And I'm short one law clerk right now. And we will try to get a decision as quickly as we can because I know that you need to have a decision from this pending motion. So I'm sorry I can't give you a time frame but we will do the best we can as soon as we can. Okay.

Mr. Brunson?

MR. BRUNSON: We appreciate that, Your Honor. One issue that's just unique because of the procedural posture of this case is that we have this pending class settlement and then we have individual claims that Mr. Ledbetter has brought, and discovery is ongoing and deadlines are coming up, and I'm concerned, not knowing which Plaintiffs are actually going to

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be there at the end of the day, about what to do with discovery deadlines, and I would just like some guidance from the Court.

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THE COURT: Well, the one thing you can do, you can file a motion to extend the discovery deadlines in that case.

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MR. BRUNSON: I think that's what we are likely to do, but I just wanted to sort of take your temperature on that issue.

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THE COURT: Well, you can't know. What parties do sometimes is if they can agree on amending -- I get this all the time about amending scheduling deadlines, and we make decisions based on when our trial date is and how it impacts the filing of motions for summary judgment and so forth. But I understand this is a complicated litigation, and so my, my suggestion to you is that you, you know, file a motion to

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MR. BRUNSON: Thank you.

extend the discovery deadlines.

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THE COURT: You talking about, you talking about what's in the scheduling order?

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MR. BRUNSON: I am, Your Honor. We have, in Mr. Ledbetter's cases, his expert was to be later this month, and then ours is 30 days after that. Understandably I'm not sure what Mr. Ledbetter's plans are with respect to his, but certainly we would like to be able to take some Plaintiffs' depositions, for example, before we disclose our experts, and we are not really in a position to depose people who we are

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trying to settle with under the class agreement. They are absent class members. We would rather know who's in and who's out before we really get into that --

THE COURT: Well, I can tell you it's going to be effective from when my decision comes out. I will not have an order out next week. I can tell you that. I mean, these things are complicated and we have got to get a transcript of what occurred here today and work on an order.

MR. BRUNSON: I fully understand that.

THE COURT: So file your motion in the other case, if you need to.

MR. LEDBETTER: And, Your Honor, from our standpoint, I mean, we are going to obviously sit down with our clients, but what we are trying to void is having Mr. Shemin's case essentially derail our case, if we are going to go forward with it. We are having difficulty in the discovery process, and we will deal that separately. I don't have a problem with extending some of these deadlines, but I think that what we don't want to do is to allow this thing to sort of get highjacked anymore because of this Day case that we have sort of not been willing to be a part of from the get-go --

THE COURT: Okay. Are you referring to the fact that, let's just say, for example, that I do certify this case and notice goes out, that until that date ends for the opt outs, you are not going to have some --

1 MR. LEDBETTER: No. 2 THE COURT: -- know how it's going to affect the 3 discovery schedule in your case? MR. LEDBETTER: No. I think what I'm trying to say 4 5 and not doing a very good job of it is is that we would be 6 concerned about just everything placed on hold as far as us 7 being able to do discovery and work our cases up pending a decision in the Day case. We don't -- I don't have a problem 8 with extending some of these deadlines, but I would have a 9 10 problem with what would amount to a stay of our cases. 11 THE COURT: Well, I don't think it ought to stay your 12 litigation. I don't think -- we may extend some of the 13 deadlines for -- in the discovery. I don't think it ought to 14 stay your case, and I'll do my best to get an order out as soon 15 as I can. 16 MR. LEDBETTER: All right. Thank you. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 18 MR. SHEMIN: No. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Good. Thank you. 20 (End of proceedings.) 21 22 2.3 24

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I, Rick L. Congdon, a Registered Merit Reporter, and Official Court Reporter for the United States District Courts, Western District of Arkansas, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript, taken before me at the time and place herein designated, consisting of pages 3 through 113 was taken down by me in machine shorthand and then transcribed via computer, either personally or under my supervision, and that this transcript is a true, correct, and complete transcript of said proceedings as reflected herein.

Signed this 7th day of October, 2014, in the City of Fort Smith, County of Sebastian, State of Arkansas.

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/s/ Rick L. Congdon

RICK L. CONGDON, RMR, FCRR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER U. S. DISTRICT COURTS WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

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